Auditor independence, incomplete contracts and the role of legal liability

European Accounting Review

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 355-375

  Acemoglu, Daron ^a   Gietzmann, Miles B ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 37049011365     PISSN: 09638180     EISSN: 14684497     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/713764727     Document Type: Article

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