Savings incentives for low- and moderate-income families in the United States: Why is the saver's credit not more effective?

Journal of the European Economic Association

Volumn 5, Issue 2-3, 2007, Pages 647-661

  Duflo, Esther ^a   Gale, William ^b   Liebman, Jeffrey ^c   Orszag, Peter ^b   Saez, Emmanuel ^d  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b BROOKINGS INSTITUTION   (United States)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 36749037695     PISSN: 15424766     EISSN: 15424774     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/jeea.2007.5.2-3.647     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (6)

1. Burman, Leonard E., William G. Gale, Matthew Hall, and Peter R. Orszag (2004). "Distributional Effects of Defined Contribution Plans and Individual Retirement Arrangements." National Tax Journal, 57(3), 671-701.
2. Davis, Douglas D., and Edward L. Millner (2005). "Rebates, Matches and Consumer Behavior." Southern Economic Journal, 72, 410-422.
3. Davis, Douglas D., Edward L. Millner, and Robert J. Reilly (2005). "Subsidy Schemes and Charitable Contributions: A Closer Look." Experimental Economics, 8, 85-106.
4. Duflo, Esther, William Gale, Jeffrey Liebman, Peter Orszag, and Emmanuel Saez (2006). "Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families: Evidence from a Field Experiment with H&R Block." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4), 1311-1346.
5. Eckel, Catherine, and Philip J. Grossman (2003). "Rebate versus Matching: Does How We Subsidize Charitable Contributions Matter?" Journal of Public Economics, 87(3-4), 681-701.
6. Eckel, Catherine, and Philip J. Grossman (2005). "Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: A Field Test Comparing Matching and Rebate Subsidies." Working paper, Virginia Tech.