The normative core of paternalism

Res Publica

Volumn 13, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 441-458

  Grill, Kalle ^a  

^a ROYAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Action reasons; Actions; Anti paternalism; Harm to others; Interference; Paternalism; Reasons

Indexed keywords

EID: 36648998969     PISSN: 13564765     EISSN: 15728692     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11158-007-9036-9     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. Or the invocation of the good of a group of people for interference with them. I will for the most part talk of single persons, though the analysis fits equally well for groups.
2. A prominent example is Gerald Dworkin, 'Paternalism', in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2002 Edition), http:// plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/paternalism/. Accessed 16 Aug 2006.
3. The third condition in Dworkin's analysis of 'X acts paternalistically towards Y by doing (omitting) Z' is: 'X does so just because Z will improve the welfare of Y' (emphasis added).
4. John Gray claims that paternalism can only be the 'genuine moral dilemma as to whether it is proper to coerce an individual solely in his own interest' - Gray, Mill On Liberty: A Defence (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 90, emphasis added.
5. Actions may be quite complex, including such state 'actions' as the formulation, adaptation and implementation of policies; policies that can involve legislation, law enforcement, taxes, information, direct aid and infrastructural adjustments.
6. J.S. Mill's liberty principle states 'that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical of moral, is not a sufficient warrant' - see Mill, 'On Liberty', in On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 14.
7. Part of the thesis of the present article is that, interpreted generously, Mill claims not only that the good of a person is not a sufficient warrant, but more generally that it is not an acceptable reason, whether or not it is sufficient. C.L. Ten has interpreted Mill along these lines: 'There are certain reasons for intervention in the conduct of individuals which must always be ruled out as irrelevant' - see his Mill on Liberty, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 40.
8. Meanwhile Joel Feinberg's professed methodology in The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Vol. I Harm to others is to investigate 'what kinds of reason can have weight when balanced against the presumptive case for liberty' - see his Harm to others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 9.
9. On Richard Arneson's interpretation of Feinberg's anti-paternalism, 'Antipaternalism says that harm or risk of harm to a person who voluntarily consents to absorb the harm or stand the risks is never a good reason for criminal prohibition' - see Arneson, 'Joel Feinberg and the Justification of Hard Paternalism', Legal Theory 11 (2005) 259-84, p. 263.
10. Cf. Mill, On Liberty p. 83: 'As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it'.
11. Cf. Ibid., p. 84: 'Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter.'
12. These include Gerald Dworkin, 'Paternalism', Stanford Encyclopedia; The Monist 56 (1972) 64-84;
13. Bernard Gert and Charles M. Culver, 'Paternalistic behavior', Philosophy and Public Affairs 6/1 (1976) 45-57;
14. John Kleinig, Paternalism (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1983);
15. Donald Van de Veer, Paternalistic Intervention (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1986);
16. David Archard, 'Paternalism Defined', Analysis 50/1 (1990) 36-42;
17. Dworkin, 'Paternalism';
18. Simon Clarke, 'A Definition of Paternalism', Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 5/1 (2002) 81-91;
19. and Peter De Marneffe, 'Avoiding Paternalism', Philosophy and Public Affairs 34/1 (2006) 68-94.
20. On some action-focused accounts of paternalism, lack of consent is listed as an independent condition on paternalistic actions. However, we may incorporate consent into the action component by assuming that whether and what kind of consent is given affects what counts as interference. This approach has the advantage of allowing for different versions of paternalism to attribute to consent as central or as marginal a role as its proponents would like in specifying interference.
21. The action component of paternalism traditionally goes by such names as 'interference with choice' (Van de Veer, p. 19),
22. 'imposition' (Kleinig, p. 7), 'violation of autonomy' (Gerald Dworkin, 'Some Second Thoughts', in Rolf Sartorius (ed.), Paternalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1983) 105-11, p. 107),
23. 'limiting liberty' (Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Vol. 2 Harm to Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986), p. ix),
24. or 'interference with the liberty of action' (Mill, On Liberty p. 14).
25. This is proposed for example by Archard, 'Paternalism Defined', pp. 38-9.
26. Clarke explicitly renounces the 'solely' and 'mainly' conditions, with the argument that also 'minor' reasons can make an action paternalistic - 'A Definition of Paternalism', p. 2, esp. n.1.
27. Kleinig, op. cit., p.12 (emphasis in original). The more formally stated definition of paternalism on p. 13 suggest a strict either or-account of the rationale for an action. The surrounding discussion, however, makes it clear that the quoted passage is more in line with Kleinig's intentions.
28. E.g. Feinberg, Harm to Self p. 8. That there are such cases is often acknowledged, but the problems they raise for the analysis of paternalism are not.
29. de Marneffe, op. cit., p. 72.
30. Mill, op. cit., pp. 122-8.
31. Ibid., pp. 84-5, 92.
32. It may be that the reasons there are for an action determine what kind of action it is. This does not pose a problem for the action-reason account. Once an action is distinguished, whether by its actual effects or by some standard based on intentionality, it may be paired with different reasons, that are reasons for that action, to form action-reasons. The framework of action-reasons is independent of how exactly actions and reasons are individuated, though theories about individuation may perhaps be informed by this framework.
33. This account of paternalism makes no direct reference to the attitude of the paternalist. To some extent, being motivated by or accepting as valid, paternalistic reasons for interference may be taken to constitute a paternalistic attitude. However, there is no reference to specific attitudes such as that of superiority or condescension, or the proper attitude of a parent towards her child. This is arguably an advantage of the account, since it is unclear whether paternalism, necessarily involves any such attitudes.
34. We may distinguish between on the one hand the relevance of a reason, determined by whether or not the value that the reason refers to is affected by the choice or action under consideration, and on the other hand the validity of a reason, determined by whether or not the reason should have any weight according to (the correct) normative principles. In order to be a reason for an action, it is enough that the reason is relevant. In order to actually give normative support to the action, the reason must also be valid.
35. Moderate anti-paternalists may want to discount paternalistic reasons in some fashion, rather than reject them outright. Louis Groarke argues against absolute anti-paternalism and suggests that for any interference the value of 'care' should be subtracted from the value of freedom - 'Paternalism and Egregious Harm', Public Affairs Quarterly 16/3 (2002) 203-30.
36. However, he believes that '[pjaternalism would be permissible only in those cases where the net value was largely or perhaps very largely negative' - p. 219, emphasis added.
37. On the other hand, extreme anti-paternalists may suggest that paternalism is so degrading that the fact that an interference protects or promotes the good of a person should not only not count as a valid reason for that interference but should actually count as a reason against it. The fact that (part of) the rationale for an interference is the good of the person interfered with 'adds insult to injury', so to speak (see Kleinig, Paternalism pp. 70-2 for ideas along these lines). Interfering with a person for selfish purposes could thus be morally better than interfering in the same way out of benevolence. To encompass this view, the rejection of an action-reason may be taken to give rise to an antipaternalistic reason against the action, with whatever weight necessary to account for the strength of the extreme anti-paternalism.
38. It follows from this interpretation that anti-paternalism cannot be dismissed with the simple observation that it is all but impossible to identify any action (and especially, perhaps, any state policy) that interferes with certain persons and promotes their good, without affecting the interests of others. This is as it should be.
39. Whether or not it is an interference depends on how interference is fleshed out as part of a more detailed conception of paternalism. Most such conceptions would consider the seizing of another's property (against her will) an interference.
40. In general, nothing prevents direct involvement with one person counting as interference with another. It could in some cases be an interference with P to seize Q's cigarettes. More commonly, it may be an interference with P to prevent Q from selling cigarettes to P. Such interference is an example of what Dworkin calls 'impure' paternalism and Feinberg a 'two-party-case' - see Dworkin, 'Paternalism', Monist, p. 68;
41. Feinberg, Harm to Self ch. 22, e.g. p. 172.
42. An alternative would be to introduce subreasons and 'effect-subreasons', which would be paternalistic if and only if the subreason referred to the good of a person and the effect was an interference with the same person.
43. Feinberg, Harm to Self, pp. 16-23.
44. Ibid., p. 16.
45. Ibid., p. 17.
46. On most action-focused accounts, the good-promotion or -protection is taken to be believed rather than actual. As for the action component, some authors focus on actual interference (e.g. Dworkin 'Paternalism', Stanford Encyclopedia), while others place the interference as well as the protection or promotion of good entirely in the head of the agent - see Gert and Culver, 'Paternalistic behaviour' pp. 49-50.