Optimal organizational hierarchies in firms

Journal of Business Economics and Management

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 79-99

  Mishin, Sergey ^a  

^a TRAPEZNIKOV INSTITUTE OF CONTROL SCIENCES   (Russian Federation)

Author keywords

Control cost; Firm; Optimal hierarchy; Structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 36549067717     PISSN: 16111699     EISSN: 20294433     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/16111699.2007.9636156     Document Type: Article

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