The European Union and post-communist Europe: One approach or several?

Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 478-500

  Dangerfield, Martin ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 36549019100     PISSN: 13523279     EISSN: 17439116     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13523270701674566     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. Gregorz Gromadski, Oleksandr Sushko, Marius Vahl, Kataryna Wolczuk and Roman Wolczuk, Will the Orange Revolution Bear Fruit? EU-Ukraine Relations in 2005 and the Beginning of 2006 (Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 2005), p.7.
2. 'Prime Minister Yanukovych: Ukraine not changing course from integration into European Union and NATO, but it will change tactic', Web Portal of Ukrainian Government, 8 Sept. 2006; available at 〈http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/en〉, accessed 8 Sept. 2006. The report added that 'Mr. Yanukovych said, stressing that the current Ukrainian government understands verywell that transformation of Ukraine into a European country depends largely onUkrainians'.
3. 'Ukraine looks to Berlin to strengthen its EU ties', euobserver.com 29 Sept. 2006, available at 〈http://euobserver.com/9/22523/?rk11〉, accessed 29 Sept. 2006.
4. This article acknowledges that Belarus is clearly a member of the WNIS but since Belarus is not yet properly engaged in the ENP the discussion mainly applies to Ukraine and Moldova, and concentrates on Ukraine in particular. It should also be said that the ENP covers various middle east and north African neighbours 'by land or sea' of the EU too, something which often prompts claims that ENP's range somehow compromises its suitability for the East European neighbours and confirms that it is an arrangement for the 'excluded'. This dimension of the debate is not followed up here as it seems a somewhat rhetorical point - the approach taken here is that it is the substance of ENP which counts and a key premise of this article is also that 'in' or 'out' cannot be defined purely by the membership factor.
5. Of course, the 'eastern wing' of the European Neighbourhood Policy also includes the Caucasian countries Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia whose putative EU membership credentials may be less grounded in an unambiguous European identity. However, they are included in the same integration scenario open to Ukraine and Moldova.
6. 'Gazeta po-ukrainiski', 2 Dec. 2005, interview with Benita Ferrero-Waldner, available at 〈http://www.delukr.ec.europa.eu/ page37467.html〉, accessed 8 Sept. 2006.
7. 〈http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/pca/ index.htm〉, accessed 15 Sept. 2006. PCA countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan; not all PCAs have entered into force, which is the case for Belarus as far as the WNIS group is concerned.
8. 〈http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm〉, accessed 15 Sept. 2006.
9. Ibid.
10. Wim Kok, Enlarging the European Union: Achievements and Challenges (Report to the European Commission) (Brussels: EUI/RSC, 2003), p.11, available at 〈http://ec.europa. eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/kok/ report_kok_en.pdf〉, accessed 15 Sept. 2006.
11. Although a free trade area with the EU was offered as part of the first contractual agreement with ECEs, SAP states, like PCA states, have to go through a preparatory stage with strong conditionality before qualifying for free trade with the EU.
12. PHARE: Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies; TACIS: Technical Assistance: Commonwealth of Independent States; CARDS: Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (in the Balkans).
13. Marise Cremona, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: Partnership, Security and the Rule of Law', in Alan Mayhew and Nathanial Copsey (eds.), Ukraine and European Neighbourhood Policy (Brighton: Sussex European Institute, 2005), pp.25-54 (p.25).
14. Alan Mayhew and Nathaniel Copsey, 'Introduction', in Mayhew and Copsey (eds.), Ukraine and European Neighbourhood Policy, pp.7-16 (p.11).
15. See Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).
16. Frank Schimmelfennig, 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Political Conditionality and its Impact on Democracy in Non-candidate Neighbouring Countries', paper presented at the 9th EUSA Biennial International Conference, Austin, TX, 31 March-2 April 2005, p.9.
17. Morton Abramowitz and Heather Hurlburt, 'Can the EU Hack the Balkans? A Proving Ground for Brussels', Foreign Affairs, Sept.-Oct. 2002, pp.2-7 (p.3).
18. Similar trends have been observable in Turkey, where public support for EU membership has been on a steady decline with the EU's tendency to play increasingly 'hard ball' since accession talks were opened.
19. Lieutenant-General Ante Gotovina, of the Croatian army, was indicted by the International Criminal Tribune for the FormerYugoslavia on charges of sanctioning war crimes against Serbs in 1995 during the war in eastern Croatia. His arrest and transfer to international custody was demanded by some countries as part of the price for opening accession negotiations. Captured in December 2005 after several years in hiding, he retains widespread popularity in Croatia as a war hero.
20. Schimmelfennig, 'European Neighbourhood Policy', p.11.
21. See 'East Europe unbound. Poland and Hungary show limit or unreality of EU influence', Financial Times, 29 Sept. 2006, p.16. Clear signs of democratic regression in the form of reverting to 'old ways' of conducting politics were also reported at the time of the October 2007 Polish parliamentary election. The ruling party was said have (Financial Times, 19 Oct. p.14) 'resorted to blatant abuse of power: Dominating state television, threatening opponents with legal action and using confidential police files to blacken rivals' reputations.' At minimum, if democratic rights need defending after EU accession then this suggests that an EU membership promise is a necessary but not sufficient condition for building a modern democratic state.
22. 'Balkan Bungling - Best EU option now is to admit Bulgaria and Romania early', Financial Times, 6 Sept. 2006, p.22.
23. EU-Ukraine Action Plan, p.1. The full text of the plan is available at 〈http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/ ukraine_enp_ap_final_en.pdf〉, accessed 15 Sept. 2006.
24. At the time of writing it was confirmed that the ENP is to undergo a process of enhancement following the European Commission's proposals 'On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy' released on 4 Dec. 2006 (see COM (2006) 726 final, available via 〈http://www.europa.eu.int〉, accessed 15 June 2007. These proposals also provided a context for negotiations that started on 5 March 2007 in Brussels between the EU and Ukraine on a successor agreement to the PCA. The details of the enhanced ENP are not included in this article but it should be stated that, if the proposed new arrangements go through and are reflected in the new agreements eventually signed with WNIS countries, then the main premises of this article are themselves further strengthened.
25. Quoted in Karen E. Smith, 'Enlargement and European Order', in Michael Smith and Christopher Hill (eds.), International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.270-91 (p.287).
26. Ibid., pp.287-8.
27. Pawel Wolowski, 'The EU Policy towards Ukraine: Integration and Exclusion Dilemmas', in Katarzyna Pelczynska-Nalecz, Alexander Duleba, Laszlo Poti and Vladimir Votapek (eds.), Eastern Policy of the Enlarged European Union: A Visšegrad Perspective (Bratislava: SFPA, 2003), pp.224-39 (p.224).
28. See Christopher Preston, 'Obstacles to EU Enlargement: The Classical Community Method and the Prospects for a Wider Europe', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.33, No.3 1995), pp.451-63.
29. Prodi's comment's reproduced from Judith Kelley, 'Promoting Political Reforms through the ENP', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.44, No.1 (2006), pp.29-56 (p.38).
30. Ibid., p.49.
31. Eneko Landaburu, 'From Neighbourhood to Integration Policy: Are There Concrete Alternatives to Enlargement?', keynote speech at CEPS Conference 'Revitalising Europe', Brussels, 23 Jan. 2006, p.2, available at 〈http://www.europa.eu.int〉, accessed 7 Sept. 2006.
32. Anders Å slund, 'The Rise and Decline of Economic Populism after the Orange Revolution, Beyond Transitions, Vol.16, No.3 (2005), pp.14-15 (p.15).
33. Andrew Tiffin, 'The Role of Institutions and Efficiency in Ukraine', Beyond Transitions, Vol.16, No.3 (2005), pp.3-4 (p.4).
34. Iryna Solonenko, 'Democracy Promotion in Ukraine: The Role of the EU', Beyond Transitions, Vol.16, No.3 (2005), p.5.
35. Michaela Dodini and Marco Fantini, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.44, No.3 (2006), pp.507-32 (p.512).
36. Ibid., p.516
37. For discussion of problems of an EEA-style relationship for the ENP countries see Tim Gould, 'The European Economic Area: A Model for the EU's Neighbourhood Policy?', Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol.5, No.2 (2004), pp.171-202.
38. Dodini and Fantini, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy', also regard the ENP as falling short of the 'near-total' integration of the EEA, although they see some relevance of the EEA example in that it is a precedent of countries willing to exchange some sovereignty in return for the economic advantages of an intense relationship with the EU. The ENP will have the added advantage of offering EU funding, something that the EEA countries did not have, of course.
39. Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, 'Relations with the Wider Europe', in Ulrich Sedelmeier and Alasdair Young (eds.), The JCMS Annual review of the European Union in 2005 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2006), pp.137-54 (p.144).
40. Kelley, 'Promoting Political Reforms', p.49.
41. Gromadski et al., Will the Orange Revolution Bear Fruit?, p.17.
42. Olli Rehn, 'Building a New Consensus on Enlargement: How to Match the Strategic Interest and Functioning Capacity of the EU', speech at the European Policy Centre, Brussels, 19 May 2006, p.3, available at 〈http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/ 316&format1〉, accessed 7 Sept. 2006.
43. Andreas Schockenhoff, 'Enlargement: Six Tests for the EU's Absorption Capacity', Europe's World (Autumn 2006), pp.90-97 (p.94).
44. Gromadski et al., Will the Orange Revolution Bear Fruit?, p.16.
45. Ibid.
46. Financial Times, 14 Feb. 2005.
47. Note that this enthusiasm on the part of MEPs cooled somewhat after the 'Orange Revolution Effect' faded; on this see Gromadsky et al., Will the Orange Revolution Bear Fruit?
48. Dodini and Fantini, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy', p.517.
49. Loukas Tsoukalis, 'The JCMS Annual Lecture: Managing Diversity and Change in the EU', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.44, No.1 (2006), pp.1-16 (p.3).
50. Financial Times, 12 Sept. 2006.
51. Landaburu, 'From Neighbourhood to Integration Policy', p.2.
52. European Commission, 'Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement', Special Eurobarometer 255, July 2006.
53. Ibid., p.74.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Kelley, 'Promoting Political Reforms', p.51.
58. The Commission's proposals for the enhanced ENP discuss sub-regional co-operation, but mainly focus on an issue or sector-based approach, identifying a possible key role for the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organization (BSEC). Mutual economic integration in the classical mode of a free trade area for WNIS states is not mentioned, meaning that subregional integration in the tradition of CEFTA and 'CEFTA 2006' either is not on the EU agenda or is being sidestepped for the moment.
59. CEFTA began life as an integration tool for Visšegrad states and has since evolved into the main tool for trade multi-lateralization in the Western Balkans.
60. See Martin Dangerfield, 'CEFTA: Between the CMEA and the European Union', Journal of European Integration, Vol.26, No.3 (2004), pp.309-88
61. also Martin Dangerfield, 'Subregional Integration and EU Enlargement: Where Next for CEFTA?', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.44, No.2 (2006), pp.305-24.
62. By the time CEFTA was reduced in size in May 2004 its membership included five states that left to join the EU (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) along with Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia.
63. The CEFTA experience also suggests that, other than a customs union move, this may be impossible for practical reasons in any case: See Dangerfield, 'CEFTA'.
64. Å slund, 'The Rise and Decline of Economic Populism', p.15
65. SES is sometimes referred to as CES.
66. Financial Times 15 Sept. 2006, p.8.