From "pirates" to "militants": A historical perspective on anti-state and anti-oil company mobilization among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta

African Affairs

Volumn 106, Issue 425, 2007, Pages 587-610

  Ukiwo, Ukoha ^a  

^a Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS)   (Nigeria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC HISTORY; MARGINALIZATION; OIL INDUSTRY; PEACE PROCESS;

AFRICA; NIGER DELTA; NIGERIA; SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA; WEST AFRICA;

EID: 36348959669     PISSN: 00019909     EISSN: 14682621     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adm057     Document Type: Article

References (111)

1. MEND came into prominence in late 2005 shortly after the arrest on treason charges of Mujahid Asari Dokubo, leader of the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF). The fact that MEND demanded the release of Dokubo and Chief Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, former governor of Bayelsa State, who was standing trial for money laundering, suggests that a major motivation for the emergence of the group was to put pressure on the Nigerian government to release the two Ijaw leaders who had championed the agitation for transfer of more resources to oil-producing states. Dokubo was released on bail in June 2007 while Alamieyeseigha, who pleaded guilty, was convicted on a six-count charge and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment in late July 2007. He was released shortly afterwards, having been in detention for almost two years. Alamieyeseigha is expected to assist the federal government in brokering a lasting truce with MEND and other militants. See J. Lohor and T. Adedoja, 'Niger Delta crisis: FG woos Alamieyeseigha', ThisDay (Lagos), 30 July 2007.
2. Illegal bunkering refers to diversion and theft of crude oil from pipelines and tankers and its sale in the underground oil market. Government and oil company sources indicate that up to 70,000 barrels of oil per day were lost in 2004 to illegal bunkering. In 2005, some senior naval officers were court-marshalled for involvement in bunkering. The latest report from industry giant Shell indicates that illegal bunkering activities declined to 16,000-24,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2006 from 20,000-40,000 bpd in 2005. See Shell Nigeria, 'People and the environment: Shell Nigeria 2006 Annual Report', Shell Nigeria Home Page, available at (18 July 2007).
3. 'Oil bubbles above $60', CNN Home Page available at (6 November 2006).
4. 'Interview: We will soon stop Nigerian oil export - Jomo Gbomo', The Humanity (Port Harcourt), 2-9 April 2007, p. 8.
5. 'Fuelling the Niger Delta crisis', Africa Report 118 (28 September 2006), p. 7.
6. 'Showdown in the Delta', Africa Confidential 47, 6 (17 March 2006).
7. A previous edition had described the actors as 'crooks, mercenaries and ambitious politicians'; see 'Mystery kidnappers', Africa Confidential 47, 3 (3 February 2006).
8. E. Cesarz, J. S. Morrison, and J. Cooke, 'Alienation and militancy in Nigeria's Niger Delta', CSIS Africa Notes, 6 (May 2003), p. 2.
9. Paul Collier, 'Doing well out of war: An economic perspective' in M. Berdal and D. Malone (eds. Greed and Grievance: Economic agendas in civil wars (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 2000), pp. 91-112.
10. David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (James Currey, Oxford, 2005).
11. D. Keen, 'Incentives and disincentives for violence' in M. Berdal and D. Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance, p. 22.
12. William Reno, 'Shadow states and the political economy of civil wars' in Berdal and Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance, p. 51.
13. Andrew Ikelegbe, 'The economy of conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria', Nordic Journal of African Studies 14, 2 (2006), p. 209.
14. See, for instance, Rene Lemarchand, 'Exclusion, marginalization and political marginalization: The road to hell in the Great Lakes' in A. Wimmer et al. (eds), Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Toward a new realism (Rowman and Littlefield, Oxford, 2004), pp. 61-77.
15. Cyril Obi, 'Re-examining the roots of war in West Africa in a globalizing world' (revised version of a paper presented at the conference on 'Globalization and Peace-building' organized by the Swedish Network of Peace, Conflict and Development Research, Uppsala, 6-8 November 2006).
16. E. Hutchful and K. Aning, 'The political economy of conflict' in A. Adebajo and I. Rashid (eds), West Africa's Security Challenges: Building peace in a troubled region (Lynne Rienner and International Peace Academy, Boulder, CO and London, 2004), pp. 195-222.
17. Claude Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa (CODESRIA, Dakar, 2000).
18. The Tiv also claim they are the fourth largest ethnic group; since Nigeria's population census contains no information on the demography of ethnic groups, it is difficult to state categorically their exact population. However, given the concentration of Ijaws in more states than the Tiv, it is safe to surmise that the Ijaw are more populous.
19. For an introduction to various Ijaw groups, see E. J. Alagoa, A History of the Niger Delta: An historical interpretation of Ijo oral tradition (Ibadan University Press, Ibadan, 1972).
20. K. O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta (Oxford University Press, London, 1956);
21. E. J. Alagoa, The Small, Brave City-State: A history of Nembe brass in the Niger Delta (Ibadan University Press and University of Wisconsin Press, Ibadan and Madison, WI, 1964);
22. and G. I. Jones, The Trading States of the Oil Rivers: A study of political development in Eastern Nigeria (Oxford University Press for International African Institute, London, 1963).
23. O. Ikime, Niger Delta Rivalry: Itsekiri Urhobo relations and the European presence 1884-1936 (Longman, London, 1969).
24. O. Ikime, 'The Western Ijo: A preliminary survey', Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 4, 1 (1967), p. 68;
25. A. E. C. Ryder, 'Missionary activities in the Kingdom of Warri to the early nineteenth century', Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 2, 1 (1960), p. 16;
26. and P. C. Lloyd, 'The Itsekiri in the nineteenth century; an outline social history', Journal of African History, 4, 2 (1963), pp. 207-31.
27. R. K. Granville and F. N. Roth, 'Notes on the Jekris, Sobos and Ijos of the Warri District of the Niger Coast Protectorate', Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 28, 1/2 (1899) pp. 104-26.
28. Ikime, 'The Western Ijo', p. 68.
29. Ibid., p. 73.
30. 'Disturbances in Warri Province', The National Archives, Kew, TNA/CO583/ 158/14, 1928.
31. Ikime, 'The Western Ijo', p. 70.
32. TNA/CO/583/158/14, 1928.
33. Indirect rule was controversial in Southern Nigeria, where there were very few precolonial centralized political systems. The decision of the British to issue warrants to chieftains who were either priests, warriors, prominent traders, or political agents generated agitations, especially where hitherto autonomous communities were placed under the jurisdiction of such warrant chiefs or where, as in most cases, such chiefs arrogated to themselves powers that were unknown to the people. See Adiele Afigbo, The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect rule in south eastern Nigeria, 1891-1929 (Longman, London, 1972);
34. and Ikime, Niger Delta Rivalry.
35. The others are Warri Division and Urhobo Division.
36. E. Falk, 'Notes on the history of taxation, affecting the Eastern Provinces and more especially Calabar Province', Rhodes House Library MSS, Afr. S. 1000(1), 1933.
37. John Sagay, The Warri Kingdom (Progress Publishers, Sapele, n.d.)
38. O. Ikime, The Member for Warri Province: Thee life and times of Chief Mukoro Mowoe of Warri 1890-1948, (Institute of African Studies, Ibadan, 1977).
39. National Archives Ibadan (NAI)/Warprof. I, No. 116/1, 1944, p. 135.
40. Letter dated 23 August 1944 by H. F. Marshall, Secretary to the Western Province, NAI/Warprof. 1, No. 116/1, p. 137.
41. 'Preliminary report on Itsekiri re-organization', NAI/Warprof. 1, No. 116/1, p. 132.
42. 'Itsekiri re-organization', NAI/Warprof. 1, No. 116/1.
43. 'Ijaw communities in Warri Division: Separation from the Itsekiri Native Authority', NAI/Warprof. 116, Vol. II, 1953, pp. 462-3.
44. 'Visit of Olu of Warri', NAI/Warprof. II, No. 86, Vol. 11, 1953.
45. NAI/Warprof. 1, No. 86, Vol. II.
46. O. Ikime, 'History of the Urhobo c. 1890-1960' in O. Otite (ed.), The Urhobo People (Shaneson C. I. Ltd, Ibadan, 2000), p. 64.
47. See also P. C. Lloyd, 'Tribalism in Warri' (Proceedings of the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research Conference, Ibadan, 1956).
48. P. C. Lloyd, 'Ethnicity and the structure of inequality in a Nigerian town in the mid 1950s', in A. Cohen (ed.), Urban Ethnicity (Tavistock Publications, London, 1974), pp. 223-50.
49. Memorandum submitted by Ogbe-Ijoh Local Council Area to the Minorities Commission', TNA/CO 957/37, 1957.
50. A. O. Ofogbor, Ethnic Crises in Warri Metropolis 1926-2003 (Department of History, University of Port Harcourt, MA thesis, July 2005).
51. S. Ogafere, 'Federal Character seeks balanced Itsekiri- Ijaw representation', The Guardian (Lagos), 24 August 2005.
52. Kenneth Omeje, High Stakes and Stakeholders: Oil conflict and security in Nigeria (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006), pp. 122-3.
53. 'Letter by Ijaws of Warri Division to Military Governor of Bendel State', 18 September 1976.
54. Gbaramatu Clan Communities, 'Memorandum submitted to the Judicial Commission of Inquiry on the Warri crisis, Asaba, Delta State' (26 May 1997).
55. Ibid.
56. See also V. F. Peretomode, 'Warri crisis survey report - Ijaw perspective' in T. Imobighe, C. Bassey, and J. Asum (eds), Conflict and Instability in the Niger Delta: The Warri case (Spectrum, Ibadan, 2002), pp. 133-55.
57. J. O. S. Ayomike, The Ijaws in Warri: A study in ethnography (Ilupeju Press, Benin City, 1990), p. 76.
58. Bendel, derived from Benin and Delta Provinces, is the new name the military gave to the Midwestern State following the creation of seven additional states in 1976.
59. 'Letter from the Ijaws of Warri and Ovia LGAs to Chairman, House Committee on Creation of More LGAs in Bendel State, Bendel House of Assembly' (8 June 1980).
60. The sense of loss among the Ijaw of Warri was aggravated by allegations by Air Vice Marshall Larry Koinyan, an Ijaw member of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), that when approval had been given for the creation of Nein-Ibe LGA with its headquarters at Oporoza, an Ijaw town, the Itsekiri leadership had influenced the government to create an essentially Itsekiri LGA. See Gbaramatu Clan Communities, 'Memorandum to the Commission of Inquiry', p. 11.
61. The Committee of Concerned Itsekiri, 'The Warri crisis and the solution' (pamphlet, Committee of Concerned Itsekiri, Lagos, 1998), pp. 37-43.
62. See also D. A. Tonwe, 'Warri crisis survey report - Itsekiri perspective' in T. Imobighe et al. (eds), Conflict and Instability, pp. 186-224.
63. The Ijaw rallied behind the military administrator. See 'Ijaws rebuff Itsekiris' attacks on Military Administrator of Delta State, Col. John Dungs', The Guardian (Lagos), 13 May 1997.
64. No reports of the Commission of Inquiry established to investigate the crisis were published. It is therefore impossible to arrive at an accurate number of casualties in the conflicts. However, submissions by the affected communities suggest that over a thousand lives were lost.
65. The 1963 Population Census, the last census in which questions on ethnicity were asked, revealed that the ethnic composition of Warri Division was as follows: Itsekiri (64 percent), Gbaramatu, Ogbe-Ijoh and Egbeoma Ijaw (14 percent), Agbarha and Okere Urhobo (1.7 percent), and other Nigerians (20 percent).
66. 'A memorandum by the Itsekiri Renaissance Council presented to the Judicial Commission of Inquiry on the Warri Crisis' (June 1997).
67. The ringleaders in the plot widely known as the Orkar coup were from southern and northern minority ethnic groups. See Julius Ihonvebere, 'A critical evaluation of the failed 1990 coup in Nigeria', Journal of Modern African Studies 29, 4 (1991), pp. 601-26.
68. The acronym derives from the Yoruba (WA), Hausa (ZO) and Igbo (BIA) word for 'come' and is used to refer to the dominance of the three major ethnic groups.
69. Attahiru Jega (ed.), Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 2000).
70. F. O. N. Roberts, Federalism, Hegemony and Petroleum in Nigeria's Political Economy (NISER Monograph Series, 3, Ibadan, 2004).
71. Obi Wali, 'Rationale for the demand for Port Harcourt State', in O. Adejuyigbe, L. Dare, and A. Adepoju (eds), Creation of States in Nigeria: A review of rationale, demands and problems up to 1980 (Federal Government Printer, Lagos, 1982), pp. 119-23.
72. Kathryn Nwajiaku, Oil Politics and Identity Transformation in Nigeria: The case of the Ijaw of the Niger Delta (Oxford University, D Phil thesis, 2005).
73. The Kaiama Declaration essentially outlines the position of the Ijaw youths on the present framework for oil exploration and marginalization of the Ijaw in the Nigerian federation. The high point of the Declaration was an ultimatum given to oil companies to quit the Niger Delta by 31 December 1998. For a discussion, see K. Nwajiaku, 'Between discourse and reality: The politics of oil and Ijaw ethnic nationalism in the Niger Delta', Cahiers d'études africaines, 178 (2005), pp. 457-96.
74. Elias E. Courson, 'The burden of oil: Social deprivation and political militancy in Gbaramatu Clan, Warri South West LGA, Delta State, Nigeria' (Niger Delta Economics of Violence Working Paper No. 15, 2007), pp. 24-8.
75. Nicolas Florquin and Eric Berman (eds), Armed and Aimless: Armed groups, guns, and human security in the ECOWAS region (Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2005).
76. Interview, Chief Bello Oboko, President of FNDIC, Warri, Delta State, 17 June 2005.
77. Human Rights Watch, 'The Warri crisis: Fuelling violence' (Human Rights Watch Reports, Vol. 15, No. 18A, New York, November 2003), p. 7.
78. Some of the articles can be accessed at and .
79. The originator of this conspiracy theory was Professor Claude Ake, the eminent Nigerian political economist, who alleged that the then Abacha regime instigated the Andom-Ogoni communal conflicts by sending unidentified soldiers disguised as Ogoni militants to attack some Andoni communities. Okechukwu Ibeanu, 'Oil the friction: Conflict management in the Niger Delta', Wilson Center Home Page available at (Summer 2000).
80. IRIN News, 'Nigeria: Niger Delta moving from agitation to rebellion?', available at (8 July 2003).
81. See also Interview, Oboko.
82. See 'Constitutionality of the Ijaw struggle: Outline of human rights law and possible areas of abuses of the rights of the Ijaw people of Warri South West LGA, Delta State Nigeria' (FNDIC Pamphlet, 11 December 2005).
83. Interview. 17 June 2005. Warri.
84. Michael Peel, 'Crisis in the Niger Delta: How failures of transparency and accountability are destroying the region' (Africa Programme Briefing Paper, 2, 2005), p. 6.
85. Africa Confidential, 'Stealing, fighting, seeking'.
86. This proposal was not implemented. See FNDIC letter to Governor James Ibori, 'In lieu of genuine peace initiative in Warri South-West and its environs' (17 July 2003).
87. International Crisis Group, 'Fuelling the Niger Delta crisis' (Africa Report 118, 28 September 2006), p. 2.
88. Ike Okonta, 'Behind the mask: Explaining the emergence of the MEND militia in Nigeria's oil-bearing Niger Delta', available at (1 November 2006).
89. Bello Oboko, 'Pathway to the Council, the Ijaw course: Being review of the interventionist agenda of the federal government - a presentation to the federal government by the Ijaw of Delta State' (FNDIC Pamphlet, 2006).
90. Emma Amaise, 'Fresh anxiety among the Ijaws over Abuja talks' Vanguard (Lagos) 15 April 2005.
91. Ishioma Okolo-Gift, 'Ijaw leader condemns killing of Niger delta militants', Vanguard (Lagos), 10 October 2006.
92. 'Oil communities approve Shell's re-entry into western swamp', The Guardian (Lagos), 28 November 2006.
93. Coursen, 'The burden of oil', p. 26.
94. A. Agbo and A. Ero, 'Operation Black Mamba begins', Tell (Lagos), 20 March 2006, p. 24.
95. Some of the computers sending the e-mails have been traced to South Africa. See Sebastian Junger, 'Blood oil on Nigeria's Delta creeks', The Guardian (Lagos), 14 January 2007.
96. Personal communication, Dr Joab-Peterside, who was a MEND mediator. See also, 'Interview: We will soon stop Nigerian oil export'.
97. 'Why we take hostages, by militants', The Guardian (Lagos), 24 June 2006, p. 14.
98. See, for instance, C. Osagie, 'Kidnappers demand £21 ransom for oil workers', This Day (L.agos), 10 October 2006, p. 52.
99. The Humanity (Port Harcourt) 2-9 April 2007, p. 4.
100. 'Interview with Dr Joab-Peterside', CASS Newsletter 14, 1 (2006). Security votes are funds budgeted by federal, state and local governments for the maintenance of law and order. The security vote is managed by the chief executive of each tier of government, who has no obligation to disclose how such funds are spent.
101. Human Rights Watch, 'Chop fine: The human rights impact of local government corruption and mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria' (Report, Human Rights Watch, New York, 2007).
102. For instance, MEND condemned the spates of kidnapping of school children in Port Harcourt in June and July 2007.
103. Omeje, High Stakes and Stakeholders.
104. Omafume Onoge, 'Social impact of pollution', CASS Newsletter 9 1-2 (2000), pp. 2-8.
105. 'Long arm of the SSS yearns for ring leader, Prince Igodo', The Humanity (Port Harcourt), 2-9 April 2007, pp. 4-5.
106. V. D. Kemedi, 'Community conflicts in the Niger Delta: Petro weapon or policy failure?' (Berkeley Workshop on Environmental Politics Working Papers, Berkeley, CA, 2003).
107. Ukoha Ukiwo, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Ethnic Conflicts: A comparative study of ethnic relations in Calabar and Warri, Southern Nigeria (Oxford University, DPhil thesis, 2006), pp. 271-3.
108. For instance, although community-related disruptions of oil production declined from 154 to 117 between 2005 and 2006, disruptions spearheaded by MEND and its allies in 2006 were more severe in their impact. Thus, whereas only 3.1 million barrels were deferred in 2005, the figure for 2006 was 12.1 million barrels. See Shell Nigeria, 'People and the environment', p. 7.
109. 'Return of the saviour', Tell (Lagos), 2 July 2007.
110. For instance, MEND observed a brief ceasefire following the release of Dokubo. See This Day (Lagos), 9 June 2007.
111. A. Agbo, 'Voting against tokenism', Tell (Lagos), 22 January 2007, pp. 27-9.