Antisocial behavior of agents in scheduling mechanisms

IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Part A:Systems and Humans

Volumn 37, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 946-954

  Garg, Nandan ^a   Grosu, Daniel ^a   Chaudhary, Vipin ^a  

^a Wayne State University   (United States)

Author keywords

Algorithmic mechanism design; Antisocial agent; Electronic commerce; Multi agent systems; Protocols; Scheduling; Scheduling mechanism; Simulation; Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) auction

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; OPTIMIZATION; PROFITABILITY;

ANTISOCIAL AGENT; SCHEDULING MECHANISM; VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES (VCG) AUCTION;

SCHEDULING;

EID: 36249030944     PISSN: 10834427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TSMCA.2007.904821     Document Type: Article

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