What is wisdom?

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 93, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 119-139

  Ryan, Sharon ^a  

^a WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 36249006731     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004257728638     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. I discuss Socrates' views on wisdom and humility principles on wisdom in much greater depth in "Wisdom" in Knowledge, Teaching, and Wisdom eds. Keith Lehrer, B. Jeannie Lum, Beverly A. Slichta, and Nicholas D. Smith (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996) pp. 233-242.
2. For Socrates' view on wisdom, see The Apology 20e-23c
3. It is worth noting that although (HP1) is a plausible interpretation of Socrates, it is not a view open to Socrates. Socrates cannot consistently believe (HP1) and also believe that the god was right in claiming that Socrates was wise. Socrates apparently believed the god was telling the truth about him being wise. Socrates did not appear to doubt whether he was wise after hearing the oracle. Rather, he was worried about how to analyze 'wisdom' given that he was wise but did not appear to be as wise as some other people.
4. (WP1) is motivated by comments made by Keith Lehrer in discussions at the N.E.H. Summer Institute on "Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom," University of California at Berkeley, 1993.
5. I say almost every topic just because I think a wise person must have expertise about living well.
6. Ned Markosian suggested this view in some comments he gave on my paper.
7. It is interesting to note that Socrates' views fit with (WP2). Let's face it, Socrates thought about some pretty important issues. Many of us would say Socrates knew a little something about knowledge, justice, truth, and so on even if Socrates claims he did not have such knowledge. Many people think of Socrates as one of the best philosophers who ever lived. What distinguishes Socrates from the poets, politicians, and craftsmen, one might argue, is that he knows about justice and other intrinsically valuable philosophical topics but they do not. (WP2) certainly fits with a plausible interpretation of The Apology.
8. I think it would be in bad taste to suggest names, so you are on your own to think up real life examples.
9. Bruce Russell proposed and defended his account of wisdom in several discussion we had at the 1993 N.E.H. Summer Institute on "Knowledge, Teaching, and Wisdom" in Berkeley, CA.
10. Although it is not obvious that Socrates will turn out to be wise on (WP3), I think the case could be made that Russell's view preserves the wisdom of Socrates. Although Socrates claims that he lacks propositional knowledge, one might claim that he did exhibit the trait of living the examined life. One could argue that knowing how to live such a life is a way of knowing how to live well. Furthermore, as noted in the discussion of (WP2), whether or not Socrates admits it, it seems reasonable to claim that Socrates really did have some propositional knowledge. For example, he knew that his name was Socrates, that 2 + 2 = 4, and that there were a lot of things he did not know about. He also knew, many would argue, important truths about justice, morality, truth, and so on. So, Russell's view looks extremely plausible and it looks like there is no conflict with (WP3) and the assumption that Socrates was wise.
11. It is worth pointing out that (WP2) could be rescued by pointing out that knowing how to live well is of very high intrinsic value. Anyone who thinks this will not reject (WP2) for the reasons I have given thus far.
12. Earl Conee proposed this objection to my objection.
13. Ted Drange proposed this objection.
14. Ned Markosian suggested this objection.
15. Ned Markosian suggested this objection.
16. Mark Aronszajn proposed this counterexample.
17. Notice that if you are persuaded by this example against (WP5), you should reject Russell's view (WP3) and Markosian's proposal (WP2) since the example works equally well there. I point this out because I believe many readers will find themselves attracted to (WP2) and (WP3) despite the criticisms I offered when I was discussing those views.
18. I defended a principle similar to (WP6) in my paper "Wisdom." Since writing that paper, Larry Powers convinced me that my view was wrong. See Sharon Ryan "Wisdom" in Knowledge, Teaching, and Wisdom, eds. Lehrer, Lum, Slichta, and Smith (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996) pp. 233-242.
19. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies for this objection.
20. Notice that this case is not like the case of the prisoner in the concentration camp. The prisoner was acting in ways that were among the best options available at the time.
21. I am assuming that one cannot appreciate the true value living well and simultaneously value self-destruction. If I am wrong about this, then I will want to revise (WP10) by adding a third condition that says: S does not value anything inconsistent with the true value of living well.
22. (WP10) is consistent with Socrates' opinion that the politicians, poets, and craftsmen were not wise. This is because they valued the wrong things. They valued living in a way that included wealth and fame but did not value living in a way that included truth, beauty, knowledge, and other things that might plausibly be thought to be included in a life of living well. A plausible case could be made that Socrates is wise according to (WP10).
23. I am especially grateful to Mark Aronszajn, Earl Conee, Ted Drange, Richard Feldman, Kenneth Lucey, and Ned Markosian for helpful comments on this paper. I presented an earlier draft of this paper to the philosophy department at Wayne State University, at The State University of New York at Fredonia, and at the Spring 1995 meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. I am grateful to comments I received during these presentations. I am also grateful to several members of the 1993 N.E.H. Summer Institute on "Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom" in Berkeley, California for stimulating discussions about this topic, especially Hugh Benson and Bruce Russell. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee from Philosophical Studies for interesting, clear, and helpful suggestions on how to improve this paper.