On the possibility of group knowledge without belief

Social Epistemology

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 249-266

  Hakli, Raul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

Acceptance; Group Belief; Group Knowledge; Rejectionism

Indexed keywords

EID: 36249002712     PISSN: 02691728     EISSN: 14645297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/02691720701685581     Document Type: Article

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