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Volumn 15, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 363-384

Mandatory rescue killings

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EID: 36148994011     PISSN: 09638016     EISSN: 14679760     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9760.2007.00282.x     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (35)

References (15)
  • 1
    • 84858475617 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • I am grateful to Alejandro Chehtman, Axel Gosseries, Cécile Laborde, David Lloyd Thomas, Dan McDermott, Tamar Meisels, Véronique Munoz-Dardé, Anne Phillips, Amy Reed, Saul Smilansky, Alex Voorhoeve and two anonymous referees for The Journal of Political Philosophy for very helpful written comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank the members of the Nuffield Political Theory Workshop and the LSE Political Philosophy and Philosophy and Public Policy Seminars for useful discussions on the issues addressed here.
    • I am grateful to Alejandro Chehtman, Axel Gosseries, Cécile Laborde, David Lloyd Thomas, Dan McDermott, Tamar Meisels, Véronique Munoz-Dardé, Anne Phillips, Amy Reed, Saul Smilansky, Alex Voorhoeve and two anonymous referees for The Journal of Political Philosophy for very helpful written comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank the members of the Nuffield Political Theory Workshop and the LSE Political Philosophy and Philosophy and Public Policy Seminars for useful discussions on the issues addressed here.
  • 3
    • 36148978583 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • One might think that being permitted to do x implies that one has the right to do so, and vice versa. However, rights, or so I assume here, correlate with duties, so that to have a right to do x means that others are under a duty to let us do x. Just as one can sometimes be permitted to do something which others are not under a duty to let us do (as is the case, for example, in Hobbes's state of nature), one can sometimes have the right to do something which one is not permitted to do (as is asserted, for example, by those who, on the one hand, believe that reading pornographic material is morally wrong and, on the other hand, maintain that others should let us do it if we so wish).
    • One might think that being permitted to do x implies that one has the right to do so, and vice versa. However, rights, or so I assume here, correlate with duties, so that to have a right to do x means that others are under a duty to let us do x. Just as one can sometimes be permitted to do something which others are not under a duty to let us do (as is the case, for example, in Hobbes's state of nature), one can sometimes have the right to do something which one is not permitted to do (as is asserted, for example, by those who, on the one hand, believe that reading pornographic material is morally wrong and, on the other hand, maintain that others should let us do it if we so wish).
  • 4
    • 77957075602 scopus 로고
    • Self-defence
    • McMahan Self-defence and the problem of the innocent attacker Ethics, 104 (1994 252 90 Otsuka Killing the innocent in self-defence Philosophy and Public Affairs, 23 (1994 74 94
    • J. J. Thomson Self-defence Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20 (1991 283 310 McMahan Self-defence and the problem of the innocent attacker Ethics, 104 (1994 252 90 Otsuka Killing the innocent in self-defence Philosophy and Public Affairs, 23 (1994 74 94.
    • (1991) Philosophy and Public Affairs , vol.20 , pp. 283-310
    • Thomson, J.J.1
  • 5
    • 0032647108 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • What is the point of equality?
    • Frankfurt Equality as a moral idea Ethics, 98 (1987 21 43 Malm Liberalism, bad Samaritan law, and legal paternalism Ethics, 106 (1995 4 31 Malm Bad Samaritan laws: harm, help, or hype? Law and Philosophy, 19 (2000 707 50
    • E. Anderson What is the point of equality? Ethics, 109 (1999 287 337 Frankfurt Equality as a moral idea Ethics, 98 (1987 21 43 Malm Liberalism, bad Samaritan law, and legal paternalism Ethics, 106 (1995 4 31 Malm Bad Samaritan laws: harm, help, or hype? Law and Philosophy, 19 (2000 707 50.
    • (1999) Ethics , vol.109 , pp. 287-337
    • Anderson, E.1
  • 6
    • 36148933768 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • I owe this objection to Axel Gosseries.
    • I owe this objection to Axel Gosseries.
  • 7
    • 36148998408 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See, for example, the recent study on conviction rates for rape, commissioned by the UK Home Office; L. Kelly, J. Lovett and L. Regan, A Gap or a Chasm? Attrition in Reported Rape Cases (London: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, February 2005). According to this study, in the UK, only 5% or so of reported rapes result in convictions.
    • See, for example, the recent study on conviction rates for rape, commissioned by the UK Home Office; L. Kelly, J. Lovett and L. Regan, A Gap or a Chasm? Attrition in Reported Rape Cases (London: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, February 2005). According to this study, in the UK, only 5% or so of reported rapes result in convictions.
  • 8
    • 84858461330 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Malm, "Bad Samaritan laws." She also expresses the worry that Bad Samaritan laws might result in wrongful convictions.
    • Malm, "Bad Samaritan laws." She also expresses the worry that Bad Samaritan laws might result in wrongful convictions.
  • 9
    • 36148950135 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • I owe this point to an anonymous referee for The Journal of Political Philosophy.
    • I owe this point to an anonymous referee for The Journal of Political Philosophy.
  • 10
    • 84937324994 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Gun control
    • H. LaFollette Gun control Ethics, 110 (2000 263 81.
    • (2000) Ethics , vol.110 , pp. 263-81
    • Lafollette, H.1
  • 11
    • 36148986815 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • There is another important difference between someone who is not under a moral duty to kill in defence of V in the first instance, and someone who is under a moral duty to do so but is granted exemption from the corresponding legal duty on grounds of conscience. In the latter case (but not in the former), in so far as R ex hypothesi owes something to V, he may be asked to provide something by way of compensation, and in lieu of this specific service, by way of a special tax, for example, or of some alternative service, just as conscientious objectors to the military draft are usually required to perform a civilian service.
    • There is another important difference between someone who is not under a moral duty to kill in defence of V in the first instance, and someone who is under a moral duty to do so but is granted exemption from the corresponding legal duty on grounds of conscience. In the latter case (but not in the former), in so far as R ex hypothesi owes something to V, he may be asked to provide something by way of compensation, and in lieu of this specific service, by way of a special tax, for example, or of some alternative service, just as conscientious objectors to the military draft are usually required to perform a civilian service.
  • 12
    • 84934348993 scopus 로고
    • Moral conflict and legitimacy
    • at p. 221. The position that there are constraints on the reasons which individuals can advance when justifying to others, in the public forum, the imposition of institutional arrangements and normative principles is known as justificatory liberalism, some of the most prominent accounts of which are, e.g., B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); G. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
    • T. Nagel Moral conflict and legitimacy Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16 (1987 215 40
    • (1987) Philosophy and Public Affairs , vol.16 , pp. 215-40
    • Nagel, T.1
  • 13
    • 36148972086 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • For an argument along similar lines, see J. Raz, The Authority of the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), ch. 15.
    • For an argument along similar lines, see J. Raz, The Authority of the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), ch. 15.
  • 14
    • 36148963306 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • In Chapter 4 of my Whose Body is it Anyway?, I argue that organ donors can raise conscientious objections to being made to provide their organs to those who need them even if potential recipients will die as a result. As my argument in this article implies, I no longer believe that this is true.
    • In Chapter 4 of my Whose Body is it Anyway?, I argue that organ donors can raise conscientious objections to being made to provide their organs to those who need them even if potential recipients will die as a result. As my argument in this article implies, I no longer believe that this is true.
  • 15
    • 36148946780 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • This objection was raised by an anonymous referee for The Journal of Political Philosophy.
    • This objection was raised by an anonymous referee for The Journal of Political Philosophy.


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