The law of war and illegal combatants

George Washington Law Review

Volumn 75, Issue 5-6, 2007, Pages 1049-1104

  Detter, Ingrid ^a,b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^c Barrister at Law   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 36049051059     PISSN: 00168076     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (398)

1. See infra Part V.B.
2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 47, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Convention I];
3. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 48, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention II];
4. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 127, Aug. 12,1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Convention III];
5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 144, Aug. 12,1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Convention IV].
6. See, e.g., Convention I, supra note 2, art. 3.
7. See infra notes 42-58, 153-55, 215-12 and accompanying text.
8. However, on different forms of consent and on implicit consent, see INGRID DETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 413-17 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER].
9. See generally INGRID DETTER, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter DETTER, CONCEPT] (rejecting customary law in its traditional form).
10. See INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 166-67 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter DETTER, LAW OF WAR];
11. DETTER, CONCEPT, supra note 6, at 46-49, 119-20.
12. On "consent" to and "acceptance" of all rules, including those of natural law, ethics, and minimum standards that may be construed as indirect or tacit by virtue of a state being a member of international society, see DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 157-65, 197-211, 220-24, 304, 439.
13. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 211-75 (chapter on restrictions on weapons).
14. See generally id. at 276-314 (chapter on prohibited methods of warfare).
15. See id. at 160-63.
16. See infra Part IV.A.
17. See DETTER, CONCEPT, supra note 6, at 46-49;
18. DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 174-76, 198, 304-05;
19. see also infra Part LB (on jus cogens and minimum standards).
20. See infra Part V.C
21. But see infra Part I.B.
22. See generally INGRID DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE (2d ed. 1992).
23. See DETTER, CONCEPT, supra note 6, at 107-13.
24. For a detailed discussion on the definition and identification of subjects of international law, see DETTER, CONCEPT, supra note 6, at 4-24
25. and DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 31-143.
26. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 160-63;
27. infra Parts II.A-B. See also the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, as well as the cases tried by the United Nations tribunals for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR).
28. See DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 175;
29. infra Part I.B.
30. See DETTER, CONCEPT, supra note 6, at 107-13;
31. DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 161-63;
32. DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 186-90.
33. See DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 189;
34. DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 3 (describing how wars are fought by individuals and not states).
35. See DETTER, CONCEPT, supra note 6, at 107-08.
36. See DETTER, CONCEPT, supra note 6, at 37;
37. cf. DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 152-56 (discussing classifications of rules of international law). Note the influence of Hegel, who inspired both fascist and communist theories and gruesome practices.
38. See G.W.F. HEGEL, VORLESUNGEN ÜBER DIE PHILOSOPHIE DER GESCHICHTE (1837);
39. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHÄNOMENOLOGIE DES GEISTES (1807).
40. DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 153;
41. see DETTER, CONCEPT, supra note 6, at 37. Even scholars of Soviet Russia accepted such rules as essential in international law at a lecture at the Institute for Law and State in 1989 as "sociologically necessary." Ingrid Detter, Peremptory Rules of International Law, Lecture at the Moscow Institut Gosudarstva i Pravo (Nov. 1989).
42. It may be important to mention that article 38 of the Statute of the Court refers to custom as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law," which is not necessarily what enthusiasts of customary law mean in their analyses. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/ index.php? p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 (last visited July 5, 2007);
43. see DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 146-211.
44. See DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 174-76.
45. For various forms of indirect or implied "acceptance," see id. at 157-249.
46. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100-01 (June 27);
47. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 3, 54 (Jan. 26);
48. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28).
49. See DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 123.
50. The Nuremberg Trials demonstrate that individuals-and not states-were convicted for war crimes. See generally, e.g., R.K. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1962).
51. On state responsibility and individual responsibility, see DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 413-30.
52. For the Tokyo Trials, see generally RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS (1972).
53. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
54. But see DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 123.
55. Convention I, supra note 2.
56. Convention II, supra note 2.
57. Convention III, supra note 2.
58. Convention IV, supra note 2.
59. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
60. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
61. The Protocols have not been ratified by, among others, the United States, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
62. See generally Convention III. supra note 2 (describing privileges granted to prisoners of war).
63. Convention III, supra note 2, art. 4;
64. see Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantanamo: The Law of International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 714-16 (2006).
65. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 1, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343. For evidence of how these principles apply under general international law, see the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Trials.
66. See ICRC, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 10 (2003), available at http://icrc.org/web/eng/ siteengO.nsf/htmlall/ 5xrdcc [hereinafter ICRC, IHL AND CHALLENGES]
67. Id. at 9 (quoting Protocol I. supra note 35. art. 51(3)).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. There are no references as to who represents the "minority" or the "middle ground." Furthermore, there is no other category listed apart from the "minority" at one end and the "middle ground" at the other. Common Article 3 refers to the identical Article 3 in each Geneva Convention.
71. See Convention I, supra note 2, art. 3;
72. Convention II, supra note 2, art. 3:
73. Convention III, supra note 2, art. 3;
74. Convention IV, supra note 2, art. 3 [hereinafter Common Article 3] (Common Article 3 to all four Geneva Conventions proscribing violence, murder, mutilation, cruelty, and torture).
75. Id. at 10.
76. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
77. See Convention I, supra note 2, art. 3.
78. ICRC, OFFICIAL STATEMENT, THE RELEVANCE OF IHL IN THE CONTEXT OF TERRORISM (2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/terrorism- ihl-210705 [hereinafter ICRC, RELEVANCE OF IHL]. TO this document there is no "Disclaimer."
79. Id.
80. See Convention IV, supra note 2, art. 4.
81. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004);
82. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004).
83. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
84. See infra Part V.C. A national may, however, benefit from certain constitutional privileges not available to aliens.
85. See ICRC, RELEVANCE OF IHL, supra note 50. When the Supreme Court relied on the Red Cross's views of the erroneous "no gap" argument as it did in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, both the Supreme Court and the ICRC failed the noble motives of Henri Dunant, the founder of the Red Cross.
86. See infra Part V.B. What must be remembered when considering such misleading comments by the Red Cross, which does not always rely on good legal advice, is that the Red Cross is only a nongovernmental organization ("NGO"), however important its earlier contributions have been to international law and practice, particularly during the Second World War.
87. See Convention IV, supra note 2, art. 5 (indicating loss of civilian privilege upon taking action "hostile to the security of the State").
88. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
90. See Al-Marri ex rei. Berman v. Wright, No. 06-7427, slip op. at 32 n.11, 52 (4th Cir. June 11, 2007).
91. On various types of soldiers as members of regular forces, volunteers, levée en masse, etc., see DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 135-50;
92. see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
93. See Convention III, supra note 2, art. 33.
94. See id. art. 118. For example, this occurred at the end of World War II.
95. See, e.g., Common Article 3, supra note 46.
96. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1946) (concerning war crimes of a Japanese officer during World War II).
97. For example, those who fought in the War of Independence in America and those who fought to establish a non-communist Croatia.
98. See Protocol I, supra note 36, arts. 43, 44.
99. See Common Article 3, supra note 46.
100. See id.
101. For example, this occurred when the efforts by Biafra to secede from Nigeria failed. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 42, 186.
102. Convention IV, supra note 2.
103. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 286-87.
104. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
106. See Convention IV, supra note 2, art. 45.
107. See David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Use of Military Commissions in the War on Terror, 24 B.U. INT'L L.J. 123, 139 (2006).
108. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
109. Id. at 30-31 (citations omitted). This passage was quoted with approval by the Attorney General in the district court proceedings of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. Respondents' Response to, and Motion to Dismiss, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 7, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 2:02cv439), rev'd, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). Quirin concerned saboteurs, 317 U.S. at 21, while Hamdi concerned a modern-day suspected al Qaeda terrorist, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
110. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
112. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 144.
113. See notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
114. See Convention III, supra note 2, art. 4.
115. Cf. DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 136-37 (describing when insurgents cross the threshold to become recognized belligerents).
116. See infra Part II.C.3.
117. For example, by taking hostages, killing civilians, or committing any other serious crimes under the law of war. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45 (1942).
119. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR. supra note 7, at 328 (discussing the treatment of some guerrillas and spies as prisoners of war). Such illegal combatants would also include, for example, those held at Guantanamo Bay.
120. See infra Part V.C.
121. International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries Dec. 4, 1989, 2163 U.N.T.S. 96 [hereinafter Convention Against Mercenaries]
122. Id. art. 3.
123. Only thirty States have ratified this Convention, and the major powers are not among these. See ICRC LIST OF STATES RATIFYING CONVENTION AGAINST MERCENARIES, http://www. icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=530&ps=P (last visited July 5, 2007).
124. DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 147. Members of so-called security companies are likely to be excluded and will probably enjoy privileges under the law of war as "accompanying personnel."
125. See Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 90, art. 1.
126. See supra Part II.C.1.
127. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 147.
128. The Convention Against Mercenaries requires that a mercenary, by definition, be motivated at least in part by material compensation. See Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 90, art. 1 §§ (1)(b), (2)(b).
129. For example, seventy-two virgins in Paradise and other rewards that may provide just as much incentive as money to a more mundane combatant.
130. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 148.
131. See Ingrid Detter, Foreign Warships and Immunity for Espionage, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 62-67 (1984).
132. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 23-25 (attempting to define "traditional" terrorism).
133. See supra Part II.B.2.
134. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR. supra note 7, at 58-61.
135. See id. at 61.
136. See supra Part II.C.1.
137. DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 25.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 24.
140. See id. at 22-23.
141. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
142. See WORLD ISLAMIC FRONT, JIHAD AGAINST JEWS AND CRUSADERS (Feb. 23, 1998), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/cbr_ctd/cbr_ctd_28. html [hereinafter WORLD ISLAMIC FRONT, JIHAD]
143. This document was published by an umbrella organization calling itself the "World Islamic Front Against Crusaders and Jews," which is a vehicle used by Osama bin Laden to build working relationships between al Qaeda and other Islamic groups. Michael Scheuer, Coalition Warfare: How al-Qaeda Uses the World Islamic Front Against Crusaders and Jews, Part I, 2 TERRORISM FOCUS (Mar. 2005), http://www.jamestown.org/ terrorism/news/ article.php?articleid=2369530.
144. See id.
145. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
147. Cf. Convention III, supra note 2, art. 17 (outlining the specific privileges of prisoners of war during questioning).
148. See infra Part III.B.
149. See supra Part II.C.1.
150. See supra Part II.C.2.
151. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 148.
152. Instead, they have primarily been classified as unlawful combatants. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
153. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 7-8, 12 (1942) (excluding a saboteur from protection).
154. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 148;
155. supra Part II.C.3.
156. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
157. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
158. Cf. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.2d 695, 701 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (describing defendant's involvement with plan to build and detonate bomb within United States).
159. See WORLD ISLAMIC FRONT, JIHAD, supra note 111.
160. Id.
161. 18 U.S.C. § 1091(c) (2006).
162. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. III(c), Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
163. id.
164. DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 417.
165. See id. at 419-30 (describing statutes regarding instances of individual responsibility for war crimes).
166. Deposited ratification November 25, 1988. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LIST OF STATES RATIFYING THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/l.htm (last visited July 5, 2007).
167. Deposited ratification March 22, 1956. Id.
168. Deposited ratification January 20, 1959. Id.
169. Genocide Convention, supra note 129, art. II(a)-(c) (emphasis added).
170. Id. art. III. Notably, conspiracy is classified as a crime.
171. Id. art. 111(b). As the Convention is of universal application, we should note that the test for conspiracy in most countries will not involve any specific intent as, under English law and under the law of a number of civil law countries, at least a different and more limited mens rea is required for the conspiracy itself.
172. See, e.g., R V. Attorney-General ex parte Rockall (1999) 1 W.L.R. 882 (Q.B.) (applying English law);
173. see also JAMES WALLACE BRYAN & J.W. DRYAN, DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONSPIRACY (LAW, POLITICS AND HISTORY) (1970). The United States, however, appended a reservation to the Convention, though it used the term "understanding" which may imply that there was a matter of "clarification" rather than a "reservation" properly so called. Reservations and Understandings of the United States of America upon Ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Nov. 25, 1988;
174. see INGRID DETTER, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 52 (1967) (discussing distinction between a "classification" and "reservation"). This reservation indicated a specific intent requirement for crimes listed in article II, such as conspiracy, but not in article III. This, to English lawyers, perhaps reflects a disproportionate attention to the mens rea, whereas in other jurisdictions any type of intent will be easily inferred from overt acts. Therefore, conspiracy under implementing legislation in the United States should also be based on overt acts or facts rather than on intent or inferred intent.
175. See Genocide Convention, supra note 129, arts. II(a), III(c).
176. Id. art. IV (emphasis added).
177. id. art. V.
178. Id. art. VI.
179. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430-31 (2004).
180. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
181. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
182. On the definition of "war" and the distinction between traditional "war" and other hostilities, see DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 17-25.
183. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
184. See infra Part V.B.
185. DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 23-25.
186. See Protocol I, supra note 36, art. 51;
187. DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 235 (discussing the illegality of the use of weapons of mass destruction).
188. See, e.g., Bryan Bender, U.S. Search for Qaeda Turns to Algeria, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2004, http://www.boston. com/news/world/articles/2004/03/ll/us_search_for_qaeda_turns_to_algeria.
189. See, e.g., Dana Priest & Ann Scott Tyson, Bin Laden Trail 'Stone Cold,' WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2006, at Al.
190. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 25.
191. ICRC, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND TERRORISM: QUESTIONS AND AN SWERS (2004), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5ynlev [hereinafter ICRC, IHL AND TERRORISM].
192. See Associated Press, Red Cross Renews Demand to See All Detainees, Dec. 9, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10397336.
193. See ICRC, IHL AND CHALLENGES, supra note 42, at 17-19;
194. see also ICRC, IHL AND TERRORISM, supra note 153. The ICRC appended the disclaimer to the latter: "The following document is for information purposes only and does not provide the comprehensive institutional position of the ICRC on the issues raised," but then refers to the abovementioned report, which takes the same position.
195. John Steele, Christmas Terror Strike 'Highly Likely,' DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 11, 2006, at 1, 2.
196. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
197. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 47-61.
198. Cf. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 665-66 (1863).
199. See supra Part II.C.1.
200. Cf. DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 25-26 (defining "war" in the traditional sense).
201. See, e.g., supra note 155 and accompanying text.
202. See DETTER, CONCEPT, supra note 6, at 37.
203. id.
204. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
205. Note, however, the efforts to support Palestine in this respect.
206. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2838 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
207. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 70-75 (defining "intervention" as "any type of 'interference' in the affairs of another State").
208. These are the "Alliance" Forces that were established under fairly dubious U.N. authority.
209. Note, for example, the capture of suspected terrorists, including Yaser Hamdi, who were transferred to Guantanamo.
210. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 14.
211. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: USAMA BIN LADIN (1998), http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/fs_bin_ladin.html [hereinafter FACT SHEET: USAMA BIN LADIN].
212. See WORLD ISLAMIC FRONT, JIHAD, supra note 111.
213. Id.
214. id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. R (Abbasi) v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598.
218. Id.
219. FACT SHEET: USAMA BIN LADIN, supra note 172.
220. See, for example, the situation in World War II with at least two important fronts.
221. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.2d 695, 699, 701 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
222. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 431 n.2 (2004) (referring to the President's determination that military detention of Padilla was necessary to prevent terrorist attacks against the United States).
223. See ICRC LISI OF STATES RATIFYING THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign? ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visited July 5, 2007).
224. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
225. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
226. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. However, President Bush has stated that the Geneva Conventions do apply to the conflict with the Taliban.
227. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush, Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.justicescholars.org/ pegc/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf.
228. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
229. Id. at 2804-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
230. Id. at 2805.
231. See Common Article 3, supra note 46. This article is called "common" as it appears in the same formulation in all four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
232. Id.
233. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention, federal courts have relied on it "as an authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties." See, e.g., Avero Belgium Ins. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73, 79 (2005) (internal quotations omitted).
234. Id. arts. 31(3)(b), 32.
235. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 9, at 201-02.
236. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795-97.
237. See Common Article 3, supra note 46.
238. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795-96 (categorizing the conflict with al Qaeda as not "international in scope" and describing how Common Article 3 protects a member of al Qaeda as part of its protection of "[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by. . . detention").
239. See id. at 2796.
240. Id.
241. See Common Article 3, supra note 46.
242. Id.
243. See supra Part IV.C.
244. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2846 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 2849.
246. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795-96.
247. See id. at 2796.
248. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, preface, 6 (The Legal Classics Library 1986) (1780).
249. Id. ch. XVII, § 1, pt. XXV, at cccxxv.
250. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796 (citing ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1351 (1987)).
251. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
252. See Convention III, supra note 2, art. 4.
253. See supra Part II.B.3.
254. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2808 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
255. See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
256. OSCAR M. UHLER & HENRI COURSIER, AM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY IV: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 51 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958).
257. The same mistake is made by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), a tribunal charged with prosecuting war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the recent conflicts in the Balkans. See ICTY General Information, http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/ factsheets/generalinfo-e.htm (last visited July 5, 2007). The ICTY explicitly affirmed this principle in a 1998 judgment, stating: [T]here is no gap between the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. If an individual is not entitled to the protection of the Third Convention as a prisoner of war . . . he or she necessarily falls within the ambit of [the Fourth Convention], provided that its article 4 requirements [defining a protected person] are satisfied. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 271 (Nov. 16, 1998).
258. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
259. See supra Part II.C.3.
260. See supra Part II.C.2.
261. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
262. Noam Lubell, Senior Researcher, Human Rights Ctr., University of Essex, Statement at the Conference to Mark the Publication of the ICRC Study on "Customary International Humanitarian Law": Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict (May 30, 2005).
263. See supra Part I.B.
264. DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 187. The clause, in one form or other, has been included in conventions on war since 1899, often cited independently as a basic and essential rule of the law of war.
265. See supra Part II.B.3.
266. The Protocols may in some parts apply to nonratifying parties by force of relevant clauses forming part of rules binding erga omnes. See supra text accompanying note 33.
267. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2785 n.40 (2006).
268. Genocide Convention, supra note 129, art. III(b).
269. Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 98 (2006).
270. See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
271. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 414-15.
272. China, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba are almost the only states that retain the communist system.
273. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28, 30 (1942)).
274. DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 304-05.
275. id. at 523-26.
276. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 414-15;
277. DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 555.
278. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
279. Id. at 484.
280. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2797 (2006).
281. For example, the Court cited Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which specify a right to a trial for any detainee. See Protocol I, supra note 36, art. 75(4)(e) (setting forth the right of an accused "to be tried in his presence");
282. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(3)(d), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (setting forth the right of an accused "[t]o be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing").
283. These articles specify a right to a trial for any detainee. See Protocol I, supra note 36, art. 75(4)(e) (setting forth the right of an accused "to be tried in his presence"); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(3)(d), Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (setting forth the right of an accused "[t]o be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing").
284. For example, the relationship between Congress and the President with regard to war powers, the constitutionality of war commissions, and the competence of federal vis-à-vis military courts.
285. For example, applications for habeas corpus, extraterritorial application of conventional rules, and evidentiary rules on hearsay.
286. See infra notes 279-73 and accompanying text.
287. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2838 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 2848-49 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)).
289. Id. at 2849 (citing Brief for the United States at 9, United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-4792)).
290. Id. at 2808 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
291. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 58 (Eng.);
292. see DAVID FELDMAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 367 (2d ed. 2002) (recognizing right to consult privately with legal representation).
293. The Supreme Court had ruled in favor of Hamdan in June 2006 when the previous military tribunal system, set up after 9/11, was held inapplicable. See supra Part V.B. Congress responded with new guidelines for war-crimes trials in the Military Commissions Act passed by Congress and signed by President Bush in 2006.
294. See generally 47A U.S.C. §§948-950 (2006).
295. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761.
296. William Glaberson, Military Judges Dismiss Charges for 2 Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, at Al.
297. Id.
298. id.
299. See Convention III, supra note 2, art. 17.
300. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
301. See supra Part I.B.
302. R v. Sec'y of State for Def. [2007] UHKL 26, [2007] 3 W.L.R. 33 (appeal taken from Eng.).
303. Id.
304. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, Dec. 19, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
305. American Convention on Human Rights art. 27, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
306. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
307. See supra Part V.C.
308. See, for example, the rules of equity in English law.
309. See supra Part III.B.
310. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 409-13 (discussing the fact that certain international norms apply regardless of reciprocity).
311. See supra Part III.A.1.
312. See DETTER, LAW OF WAR, supra note 7, at 417-18.
313. Id. at 285-88.
314. Id. at 293. This is probably a general rule; specific prohibition is laid down in Protocol II, supra note 37, art. 15.
315. See Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474;
316. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation art. 1, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 178;
317. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft art. 1, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105;
318. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft arts. 1(1), 11, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
319. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 52/164, annex arts. 2, 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (Dec. 15, 1997).
320. Note that possession of nuclear material is a universal crime even at the attempt or threat stage. See Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, art. 7, Mar. 3, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 124.
321. See DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 413-17.
322. See generally Ireland v. United Kingdom (Torture Case), 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1978).
323. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 260, arts. 5, 6.
324. Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, 1922, 23 & 23 Geo. 5, c.12 (N. Ir.).
325. See Torture Case, supra note 272.
326. The Special Powers Act was replaced by the Detention of Terrorists Order, 1972, S.I. 1632 (N. Ir.). The Order provides for the appointment of legally qualified Commissioners who have held judicial office or are barristers, advocates, or solicitors of at least ten-years standing.
327. After the threat of the Irish terrorists had waned, the time of detention without charge in the United Kingdom was reduced to fourteen days. The Terrorism Act of 2000 further reduced the time that a suspected terrorist could be held to forty-eight hours. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 41(3) (Eng.). The Terrorism Act of 2006 most recently amended the length of detention to twenty-eight days. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 23(7) (Eng.). Prime Minister Blair had sought a rule of ninety days but his proposal was defeated by a vote in the House of Commons of 322 to 291.
328. See 439 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 310.
329. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 260, art. 15.
330. Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 1 29, 36 (1961).
331. Id. 1 36.
332. Id.
333. The court held in later cases that the term "court," as defined in the Convention, merely means that this organ must have a "judicial" character; that is, it must be "independent" both of the executive and of the parties to the case. Neumeister v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44 (1968);
334. see Matznetter v. Austria, 10 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1969) (summarily agreeing with the result on this point in Neumeister). This, however, does not preclude it from being an administrative organ exercising a judicial function.
335. See HOME OFFICE, COUNTER- TERRORISM POWERS: RECONCILING SECURITY AND LIBERTY IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 1 (2004). Detention orders can be made under Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 23 (U.K.).
336. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
337. See supra Part V.D.
338. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.
339. See supra Part V.C.
340. See supra Part III.B.
341. See, e.g., Republic of Bolivia v. Indemnity Mut. Marine Assurance Co. (1909) 1 K.B. 785 (referring to pirates as hostes humani generis).
342. See Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., The Dread Pirate Bin Laden, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug. 2005, at 32, 35-36; .
343. see also Darin Phaovisaid, Where There's Sugar, the Ants Come: Piracy in the Strait of Malacca, 14 INT'L AFF. REV. 81, 87-88 (2005) (classifying "political piracy" as terrorism).
344. Jesse S. Reeves, Progress of the Work of the League of Nations Codification Committee, 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 659, 665 (1927).
345. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter High Seas Convention].
346. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention].
347. See id. art. 101;
348. High Seas Convention, supra note 292, art. 15.
349. Harvard Research in Int'l Law, Draft Convention on Piracy, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 739 (1932) [hereinafter Harvard Draft on Piracy].
350. Id. at 743.
351. Id. (emphasis added).
352. See Burgess, supra note 290, at 36.
353. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 293, art. 105.
354. See id. art. 101(a);
355. High Seas Convention, supra note 292, art. 15(1).
356. See Harvard Draft on Piracy, supra note 295, at 743.
357. Cf supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing how terrorists' intangible religious motives can still be classified as "for private gain").
358. See Harvard Draft on Piracy, supra note 295, at 743.
359. Cicero, Against Verres, (II.5, 76), at 53, in ON GOVERNMENT (Michael Grant trans. 1993).
360. See supra text accompanying note 111.
361. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
362. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 293, art. 100;
363. High Seas Convention, supra note 292, art. 14.
364. See Burgess, supra note 290, at 36.
365. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
366. Id. at 77 (Moore, J., dissenting).
367. See DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 413-17.
368. Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT''L L.J. 183, 190 (2004).
369. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 616 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
370. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 121, 144 (2007);
371. see also Kontorovich, supra note 312, at 205-06 (discussing how the "heinousness" of piracy is the reason for universal jurisdiction over the crime).
372. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
373. See DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 413-17.
374. Liangsiriprasert v. Gov't of the U.S., [1991] 1 A.C. 225 (P.C.) (appeal taken from H.K.). In Liangsiriprasert, the House of Lords held that a conspiracy entered into in Thailand with the intention of committing a criminal offense in Hong Kong was justiciable in Hong Kong, even if no overt act pursuant to the conspiracy had yet occurred in Hong Kong.
375. See id. at 251.
376. Id.
377. See, e.g., R v. Page, [1954] 1 Q.B. 170, 177 (C.M.A.C).
378. R (Al-Fawwaz) v. Governor of Brixton Prison [2001] UKHL 69, [2002] 1 A.C. 556, 593 (appeal taken from Eng.) (quoting Belgium v. Postlethwaite [1988] 1 A.C. 924, 947 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)).
379. Al-Fawwaz, [2001] UKHL 69 at 593.
380. See Taking of Hostages Act, 1982, c. 28, § 1 (Eng.).
381. See Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 134 (Eng.).
382. For instance, the courts of England have for centuries had jurisdiction to try cases of murder allegedly committed by English and, later, British subjects anywhere in the world. See, e.g., R v. Page, [1954] 1 Q.B. 170, 177 (C.M.A.C).
383. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation art. 5, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 178;
384. see also DETTER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 402-54.
385. R (Abbasi) v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1598, ¶ 1.
386. Id. ¶ 49.
387. Extradition Act, 1989, c. 33, § 20, sched. 1 (Eng.). The same must have applied to the equivalent provision in the 1870 Act. See Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 52 (Eng.).
388. In re Tivnan, (1864) 122 Eng. Rep. 971 (Q.B.).
389. Id. at 972.
390. See id. at 974.
391. See id. at 976.
392. in re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586 (P.C.) (appeal taken from H.K.).
393. Id. at 589. It is interesting to note that the court, in arriving at this conclusion, relied on Grotius's De Jure Belli ac Pacis.
394. R (Al-Fawwaz) v. Governor of Brixton Prison [2001] UKHL 69, [2002] 1 A.C. 556, 580-81 (appeal taken from Eng.).
395. Belgium v. Postlethwaite [1988] 1 A.C. 924, 947 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
396. Liangsiriprasert v. Gov't of the U.S., [1991] 1 A.C. 225, 251 (P.C.) (appeal taken from H.K.).
397. In re Tivnan. (1864) 122 Eng. Rep. 971 (Q.B.) (Cockburn, C.J., dissenting). This dissent foreshadowed statements of the House of Lords in future cases. See supra notes 317-11 and accompanying text.
398. On such solidarity and duty to uphold fundamental rules, see DETTER, CONCEPT, supra note 6, at 124-28.