Pandemic preparedness

Current Opinion in Critical Care

Volumn 13, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 742-747

  Gomersall, Charles D ^a   Loo, Shi ^b   Joynt, Gavin M ^a   Taylor, Bruce L ^c  

^a CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^b TAN TOCK SENG HOSPITAL   (Singapore)

^c PORTSMOUTH HOSPITALS NHS TRUST   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Disasters; Ethics; Influenza; Occupational health; Triage

Indexed keywords

CRITICALLY ILL PATIENT; EMERGENCY HEALTH SERVICE; EQUIPMENT; ETHICS; HOSPITAL BED CAPACITY; HUMAN; INFLUENZA; INTENSIVE CARE UNIT; MEDICAL ETHICS; OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY; PANDEMIC; REVIEW; SAFETY; SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME; TRAINING;

CRITICAL ILLNESS; DISASTER PLANNING; DISASTERS; DISEASE OUTBREAKS; ETHICS, MEDICAL; HOSPITAL BED CAPACITY; HUMANS; INFLUENZA, HUMAN; INTENSIVE CARE UNITS; OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH; TRIAGE; WORLD HEALTH;

EID: 35848949039     PISSN: 10705295     EISSN: 15317072     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1097/MCC.0b013e3282f1bafd     Document Type: Review

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