Does causal knowledge help us be faster and more frugal in our decisions?

Memory and Cognition

Volumn 35, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 1399-1409

  Garcia Retamero, Rocio ^a,b   Wallin, Annika ^c,d   Dieckmann, Anja ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GRANADA   (Spain)

^c LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^d Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; ASSOCIATION; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; ENVIRONMENTAL FACTOR; FEMALE; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; HYPOTHESIS; KNOWLEDGE; LEARNING; MALE; NORMAL HUMAN;

EID: 35748967882     PISSN: 0090502X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/BF03193610     Document Type: Article

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