Firm compliance with social insurance obligations where there is a weak surveillance and enforcement mechanism: Empirical evidence from Shanghai

Pacific Economic Review

Volumn 12, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 577-596

  Maitra, Pushkar ^a   Smyth, Russell ^a   Nielsen, Ingrid ^a   Nyland, Chris ^a   Z hu, Cherrie ^a  

^a MONASH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPLIANCE; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; FIRM SIZE; INSURANCE SYSTEM; PROBABILITY;

ASIA; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST; SHANGHAI;

EID: 35748951897     PISSN: 1361374X     EISSN: 14680106     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2007.00373.x     Document Type: Article

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