Sultan, clan and patronage the dilemmas facing Central Asia's regimes;Sultan, klan und patronage regimedilemmata in zentralasien

Osteuropa

Volumn 57, Issue 8-9, 2007, Pages

  Heinemann Grüder, Andreas ^a   Haberstock, Holger ^b  

^a Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn   (Germany)

^b FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35648967154     PISSN: 00306428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (61)

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2. Martha Brill Olcott: Central Asia's Second Chance. Washington D.C. 2005, S. 125.
3. Staatskapazitäten beziehen sich auf das Angebot öffentlicher Leistungen und die Fähigkeit, diese umzusetzen; Joel S. Migdal: Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton 1988.
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11. Shirin Akiner: The Formation of Kazakh National Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State. London 1995.
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17. Galina M. Yemelianova: The Growth of Islamic Radicalism in Eurasia: Internal Determinant, Comparative Perspective and Potential Consequence. Paper Presented at the Association for the Study of Nationalities, 2007 World Convention, New York, April 12-14, 2007.
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20. Evidenz für Doppelstandards präsentiert Gordon Crawford: Promoting Democracy in Central Asia: What's Needed and Why it Won't Happen. Konferenz "The Quandaries of Promoting Democracy in Central Asia", Centre for OSCE Research, Universität Hamburg 9.-11.2.2007.
21. Craig Murray: Murder in Samarkand. A British Ambassador's Controversial Defiance of Tyranny in the War on Terror. Edinburgh 2007.
22. Zur Inkohärenz von Standards der Demokratieförderung: Thomas Carothers: The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion, in: Foreign Affairs, 2/2006, S. 55-68.
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28. Joel Carmel: Machteliten in Usbekistan. Clans oder politische Allianzen? In: Orient, 4/2005, S. 581-608, hier S. 605.
29. Jan Koehler, Christoph Zürcher: Conflict and the State of the State in the Caucasus and Central Asia, in: Berliner Osteuropa Info, 21/2004, S. 57-67.
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32. Starr, Clans [Fn. 13].
33. Kathleen Collins: Clans and Regime Transition in Central Asia. Cambridge 2006, S. 100.
34. Eric W. Sievers: Usbekistan's Mahalla: From Soviet to Absolutist Residential Community Association; 〈www.kentlaw.edu/jicl/articles/ spring2002/JICL%20Sievers%20Mahalla%20final%20for%20publication.pdf〉.
35. Roy, The New Central Asia [Fn. 1], S. 89 und S. 97f.
36. ICG: Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution. Bishkek/Brussels, 4.5.2005, S. 3; 〈www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1254&1=〉.
37. ICG: Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan. Problems and Prospects. Asia Report 81/2004. Brussels/Bishkek, 11.8.2004; 〈www.crisisgroup.org/home/ index.cfm?id=1254&1=1〉.
38. ICG, Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State. Asia Report 109/2005. Bishkek/Brussels, 16.12.2005, S. 22; 〈www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm? id=1254&1=1〉.
39. ICG, Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution [Fn. 19], S. 14.
40. Michel E. Commercio: Conflict in Kyrgyzstan? Woodrow Wilson Center Occasional Paper, 286/2004; 〈http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent? serviceID=PublishingHouse&ileid64BB37A8-7CAA-52D4-C8C1-43957B41B035&Ing= en〉.
41. ICG, Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution [Fn. 19], S. 13.
42. ICG, Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan [Fn. 20], S. 16f.
43. ICG, Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State [Fn. 21], S. 3.
44. Ebd., S. 8.
45. ICG, Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan [Fn. 20], S. 17.
46. 〈www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/154.0.html〉, S. 5.
47. ICG, Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan [Fn. 20], S. 6. - ICG, Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution [Fn. 19], S. 6f.
48. Carmel, Machteliten in Usbekistan [Fn. 11], S. 598.
49. Kai Wegerich: A Little Help From My Friend? Analysis of Network Links on the Meso Level in Uzbekistan. Unpublished Paper, Wageningen University, März 2006.
50. Carmel, Machteliten in Usbekistan [Fn. 11], S. 586.
51. ICG: Turkmenistan after Niyazov, Asia Briefing 60, 12.2.2007, S. 14; 〈www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4659〉.
52. Mario Petri, Ulrich Schnier, Jürgen Bellers (Hg.): Handbuch der transitorischen Systeme. Diktaturen und autoritäre Regime der Gegenwart. Berlin 2006, S. 500.
53. ICG: Repression and Regression in Turkmenistan: A New International Strategy. Asia Report 85. Osh, Brussels, 4.11.2004; 〈www.crisisgroup.org/ library/documents/asia/central_asia/ 085_repression_and_regression_in_turkmenistan_new_intl_strategy.pdf〉.
54. ICG, Turkmenistan after Niyazov [Fn. 34], S. 5.
55. ICG, Repression and Regression in Turkmenistan [Fn. 36], S. 14.
56. Bertelsmann Transformation Index. Gütersloh 2006, S. 4; 〈www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/11.0.html?&L=1〉.
57. ICG: Cracks in the Marble: Turkmenistan's Failing Dictatorship, Asia Report 44/2003, Osh/Brussels, 17.1.2003; 〈www.crisisgroup.org/library/ documents/asia/central_asia/ 044_cracks_in_the_marble_turkmenistan_failing_dictatorship.pdf〉, S. 26.
58. ICG, Turkmenistan after Niyazov [Fn. 34], S. 12.
59. Philip G. Roeder: Varieties of Post-Soviet Authoritarian Regimes, in: Post-Soviet Affairs, 1/1994, S. 61-101.
60. 〈www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf/ BTI_2006_Ranking_detaillert.pdf〉 Da die Vergabe der Punkte beim Bertelsmann Management-Index intransparent und stark subjektiv gefärbt ist, die dahinter stehenden Rohdaten und deren Kohärenz jedenfalls nicht intersubjektiv nachvollziehbar sind, können sie nur als Schnappschuss gewertet werden.
61. Henry E. Hale: How the Mighty Fall: The "Coloured Revolutions" and Eurasia's Democratic Prospects. Vortrag vor der "Association for Study of Nationalities". Columbia University, March 23-25, 2006.