Public support for democracy in China

Journal of Contemporary China

Volumn 16, Issue 53, 2007, Pages 561-579

  Wang, Zhengxu ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; DEMOCRATIZATION; HUMAN RIGHTS; PUBLIC ATTITUDE; SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT;

ASIA; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST;

EID: 35648954065     PISSN: 10670564     EISSN: 14699400     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10670560701562283     Document Type: Article

References (72)

1. This argument is made by A. Przeworski and F. Limongi, 'Modernization: theories and facts', World Politics 49(2), (1997), pp. 155-183. In 2001, China's national income per capita was $890 in real dollars and $3,950 in purchasing power parity.
2. Huntington also argues that mid-level income countries are more likely to make the transition into democracy; see S. P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
3. This is explained in T. Vanhanen, Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries (London and New York: Routledge, 1997).
4. Y. Zheng, Will China become Democratic? Elite, Class and Regime Transition (Singapore: East Asia Institute, 2004).
5. E. R. Bellin, 'Contingent democrats: Industrialists, labor, and democratization in late-developing countries', World Politics 52(2), (2000), pp. 175-205
6. D. D. Yang, 'The social bases of third wave democratization: reconsidering the role of class in Taiwan's transition to democracy', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC (2005).
7. Kang Xiaoguang is the main scholar who argues for the forming of such an alliance, though other scholars such as Sun Liping also share similar assessments. See, for example, X. Kang, '90 niandan zhongguo zhengzhi wendingxing yanjiu' ['Political stability of China in the 1990s'], Ershiy Shiji [21st Century] no. 4, (2002), pp. 33-45
8. L. Sun, 'Quanli shiheng, liangji shehui yu hezuozhuyi xianzheng tizhi' ['Unbalanced rights, dichotomous society, and collaborative constitutional system'], Zhanlue yu Guangli [Strategies and Management] no. 1, (2004), pp. 1-6.
9. A. J. Nathan, 'Authoritarian resilience', Journal of Democracy 14(1), (2003), pp. 6-17.
10. For the debate between Andrew Nathan's regime renewal argument, or in his words, 'authoritarian resilience', and Pei Minxin's regime crisis argument, see no. 1 of Journal of Democracy (2003)
11. and M. Pei, 'China's governance crisis', Foreign Affairs 81(5), (2002), pp. 96-119.
12. For a comprehensive examination of the challenges facing China's transition, see M. Pei, China's Trapped Transition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
13. See, for example, L. W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968)
14. L. W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan, 1988).
15. M. R. Thompson, 'Whatever happened to "Asian values"?', Journal of Democracy 12(4), (2001), pp. 154-165.
16. See S. Hu, 'Confucianism and Western democracy', in S. Zhao, ed., China and Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 55-72.
17. J. Chan, 'Asian values and human rights: An alternative view', in L. J. Diamond and M. F. Plattner, eds, Democracy in East Asia (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 28-41
18. W.-M. Tu, 'Implications of the rise of "Confucian" East Asia', Daedalus 129(1), (2000), pp. 195-218
19. Y.-S. Yu, 'Confucianism and Chinese encounter with the West in historical perspective', Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy IV(2), (2005), pp. 203-216
20. S. O'Dwyer, 'Democracy and Confucian values', Philosophy East and West 53(1), (2003), pp. 39-63.
21. See their most recent work, R. Inglehart and C. Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (2005).
22. A. J. Nathan and T. Shi, 'Cultural requisites for democracy in China: some findings from a survey', Daedalus 122(2), (1993), pp. 95-123.
23. A. J. Nathan and T. Shi, 'Left and right with Chinese characteristics: issues and alignments in Deng Xiaoping's China', World Politics 48(4), (1996), pp. 522-550.
24. T. Shi, 'Cultural values and democracy in the People's Republic of China', The China Quarterly no. 162, (2000), pp. 540-559.
25. X. Chen and T. Shi, 'Media effects on political confidence and trust in the People's Republic of China in the post-Tiananmen period', East Asia 19(3), (2001), pp. 84-118
26. T. Shi, 'Cultural values and political trust: A comparison of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan', Comparative Politics 33(4), (2001), pp. 401-419.
27. Y. Zhong, J. Chen and J. Scheb, 'Mass political culture in Beijing: findings from two public opinion surveys', Asian Survey 38(8), (1998), pp. 763-783.
28. Y. Zhong, 'Democratic values among Chinese peasantry: An empirical study', China: An International Journal 3(2), (2005), pp. 189-211.
29. W. Tang, 'Political and social trends in the post-Deng urban China: crisis or stability', China Quarterly no. 168, (2001), pp. 890-909.
30. A more comprehensive examination of the data is given by W. Tang, Public Opinion and Political Change in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). Clearly, however, the explicit support for democracy is not its focus.
31. D. V. Dowd, A. Carlson and M. Shen, 'The prospects for democratization: evidence from the 1995 Beijing Area Study', Journal of Contemporary China 8(22), (1999), pp. 365-380.
32. Among studies of political attitudes of Chinese citizens, political trust or regime support seems to be an area attracting the most recent attention. Several of the studies reviewed above touch on support for government or satisfaction with government performance. Meanwhile, studies specifically focusing on political trust include Z. Wang, 'Before the emergence of critical citizens: Economic development and political trust in China', International Review of Sociology 15(1), (2005), pp. 155-171
33. L. Li, 'Political trust in rural China', Modern China 30(2), (2004), pp. 228-258
34. J. Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China (Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2004)
35. Z. Wang, 'Political trust in China: Forms and causes', in L. White, ed., Legitimacy: Ambiguities of Political Success or Failure in East and Southeast Asia (Singapore: World Scientific, 2005), pp. 113-140.
36. For information about World Values Survey, see its website: www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
37. The participating societies in the first wave of East Asia Barometer included: Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Within the global 'barometer' network, there is currently a Eurobarometer, an Afrobarometer, a Latinobarometer, and an East Asian Barometer. Starting from the second wave (2005-2006), India and several countries have been added to the East Asia Barometer, hence the project now takes the name Asian Barometer.
38. Tianjian Shi refers to this as a 'nation-wide survey on political culture and political participation' (Shi, 'Cultural values and democracy in the People's Republic of China'). The name 'Social Change and Social Attitudes' I use here is a translation of the title of the survey I found on the Chinese version of the questionnaire which I obtained from Tianjian Shi.
39. Several studies have come out of these datasets. From the 1993 Social Change and Social Attitudes Survey, there are: Shi, 'Cultural values and democracy in the People's Republic of China'
40. Chen and Shi, 'Media effects on political confidence and trust in the People's Republic of China in the post-Tiananmen period'
41. Shi, 'Cultural values and political trust'.
42. From the World Values Survey China (2001), there are: Wang, 'Before the emergence of critical citizens'
43. Wang, 'Political trust in China'
44. Z. Wang, 'Changing social values and democratization in China and East Asia: The self-expression phenomenon and citizen politics in six Confucian societies, 1981-2001', working paper, Department of Political Science (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 2005). And from the EAB China (2002):
45. Z. Wang, 'Explaining regime strength in China', China: An International Journal 4(2), (2006).
46. The WVS survey was carried out in cooperation with the Research Center for Contemporary China of Peking University, while the EAB survey was carried out in cooperation with the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Social Science Academy. The 1992-1993 Social Change and Social Values survey was carried out in cooperation with the Social Survey Research Center of the People's University of China.
47. For a detailed documentation of this sampling method, which is used in all three surveys here, see the appendix in Nathan and Shi, 'Left and right with Chinese characteristics'. Also the EAB Project and the collaborating institutes in China provide documentations of the sampling process.
48. Our data show that among those surveyed in China, for questions about democracy or other questions that require a certain amount of political knowledge, the proportion answering 'do not know' or no answer is frequently high (about 20% in most cases).
49. See the reporting of this finding in R. Inglehart, 'How solid is mass support for democracy - and how can we measure it?', PS Political Science & Politics, (2003), pp. 51-57.
50. H.-D. Klingemann, 'Mapping political support in the 1990s: A global analysis'', in P. Norris, ed., Critical Citizens (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 31-56.
51. The original wording of the question is: 'Do you agree, strongly agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with this statement: Broadening democracy in our country now would affect stability?'
52. Surveys found that in recently democratized Taiwan and South Korea, people demonstrated resentment of democratic practices, and some even felt that authoritarian rule may be better under certain circumstances. This can help explain the similar fear of the social chaos that many Chinese citizens feel democratization may cause, see Y.-H. Chu, L. J. Diamond and D. C. Shin, 'Halting progress in Korea and Taiwan', Journal of Democracy 12(1), (2001), pp. 122-136.
53. Some people may quickly dismiss this high-level satisfaction as unreal. They may think citizens in China are afraid of government persecution, hence they cannot express their dissatisfaction. These people think that for a citizen in China, the 'correct' answer to this question is to say 'yes, I am satisfied with what the government does'. In fact, today, Chinese citizens are able to express their opinion, at least in their daily conversations, without much fear of persecution. Many researchers have documented the expressed discontent in China - see some of the works by Li Lianjiang, O'Brien, and Yu Jianrong, for example J. Yu, 'Nongmin youzuzhi kangzheng ji qi zhengzhi fengxian' ['Organized resistances of peasants and their political risks'], Zhanlue yu Guangli [Strategies and Management] no. 3, (2003), pp. 1-16. In the data I am analyzing, many respondents report distrust in and criticism of the government. For example, many express their dissatisfaction of the police and other government agencies. And many pointed out that government corruption is very serious.
54. See, for example, Nathan, 'Authoritarian resilience'
55. Li, 'Political trust in rural China'
56. and Wang, 'Before the emergence of critical citizens'.
57. The worst area, however, is in government corruption. Some 54% of the respondents feel things are much worse, with another 33% feel things are 'somewhat worse', making a total of dissatisfaction 87%!
58. For sure, there are also people who feel 'satisfied' or 'rather satisfied' because of the lack of alternatives. That is, although they desire faster or bigger political changes, they have no choice but to go along with the majority in accepting the realities. Some of them may feel the current regime is too powerful to challenge, others feel it is still important to keep the current regime as it is necessary for providing public goods, such as social stability and economic growth. You may call these the 'passive' supporters. In any case, it is fair to say that the majority is reluctant to pursue rapid and fundamental changes such as overthrowing the CCP and replacing it with a multi-party system.
59. This is the post-materialism argument advocated by modernization theorists such as Ronald Inglehart: Individuals do not obtain the aspiration of liberty and political rights until they enjoy material security for a sustained long period of time. See R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977). Those people who put material security as less important than political rights and liberty are called post-materialists. The proportion of post-materialists among China's population is still very small, lower than 10%, while in countries that have enjoyed between three and five decades of economic prosperity (such as Western Europe), the post-materialists account for 50-70% of the population.
60. This theory is advanced by Ronald Inglehart in a series of works starting from the 1970s. See Inglehart, The Silent Revolution
61. R. Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997)
62. R. Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
63. In mathematical terms, 34 is about 1.5 times greater than 22. Hence, 34% is 50% higher than 22%.
64. In a study based on a sample of Beijing residents (Dowd et al., 'The prospects for democratization'), the authors reported that older people are more likely to see building political democracy as an important value. But they also found that the post-reform cohort (the youngest cohort in their study) value individual freedom more than any other cohorts.
65. Some important aspects of the democratic attitudes and behaviors of Chinese citizens are left unexamined in this study. For example, I did not examine whether there are differences between the two genders, between people of different levels of education, and between urban and rural residents. Also, I did not look at whether different attitudes about democracy are related to different behavior patterns, such as the propensities to join civil society groups and to launch protests. For some useful studies in these regard, see, among others, Tang, Public Opinion and Political Change in China
66. Wang, 'Changing social values and democratization in China and East Asia'.
67. Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy
68. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution
69. Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization.
70. See, for example S. Ogden, Inklings of Democracy in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
71. See a discussion in Nathan, 'Authoritarian resilience'.
72. Theoretic debates on the influence of Confucian heritage on Asian citizens' political attitudes abound. For an empirical test of related hypotheses, see Z. Wang and E.-S. Tan, 'Self-expression, "Asian values", and democracy: East Asia in global perspective', in R. J. Dalton and D. C. Shin, eds, Citizens, Democracy, and Markets around the Pacific Rim (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 50-72.