Interest group activity and long-run stock market performance

Public Choice

Volumn 133, Issue 3-4, 2007, Pages 343-358

  Coates, Dennis ^a   Wilson, Bonnie ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND BALTIMORE COUNTY   (United States)

^b SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Institutional sclerosis; Special interest groups; Stock returns; Volatility

Indexed keywords

EID: 35648944247     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9191-8     Document Type: Article

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