Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protect

International Affairs

Volumn 83, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 1039-1054

  De Waal, Alex ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 35548930311     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: 14682346     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00672.x     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Datfur: a short history of a long war (London: Zed, 2005); Alex de Waal, ed., War in Darfur and the search fir peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
2. R. S. O'Fahey, State and society in Darfur (London: Hurst, 1980),
3. and The Dar Fur sultanate (London: Hurst, 2007).
4. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Darfur: the long road to disaster (Princeton, NJ : Markus Wiener, 2006).
5. Ali Haggar, 'The origins and organization of the Jaujaweed in Darfur', in de Waal, ed., War in Darfur and the search for peace, pp. 113-39.
6. Alex de Waal, 'Darfur's deadline: the final days of the Abuja peace process', in de Waal, ed., War in Darfur and the search for peace, pp. 267-83.
7. Julie Flint, 'Darfur's armed movements', in de Waal, ed., War in Darfur and the search for peace, pp. 140-72.
8. Rebecca Hamilton and Chad Hazlett, '"Not on our watch" : the emergence of the American movement for Darfur', in de Waal, ed., War in Darfur and the search for peace, pp. 337-66 at p. 342.
9. Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen, eds, Genocide in Darfur: investigating the atrocities in the Sudan (London : Routledge, 2006).
10. The case of violations committed during the war in the north of Uganda had already been referred to the ICC by the government of Uganda.
11. United Nations, 'Report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur', letter dated 5 June 2007 from the Secretary General of the United Nations to the President of the Security Council, S/2007/307/Rev1, 6 June 2007.
12. For example, on 16 April 2007 President Bashir agreed to the 'heavy support package' for AMIS, one of the main US demands, and two days later President Bush announced that he would impose sanctions on Sudan after 30 days unless there was substantial progress on three issues, one of which was the deployment of the 'heavy support package'.
13. http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/georgeclooneyunitednations.htm, accessed 14 Aug. 2007.
14. International Crisis Group, To save Darfur, report 105, 17 March 2006. The report devotes approximately seven times as much space to international forces than to the peace process. The ICG insists that it has treated peace and protection as equal priorities, but the balance of its reports and advocacy was skewed very heavily towards troops, especially when the peace process was in its critical stages.
15. UN General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the 'Brahimi Report'), A/55/305-S/2000/809, 2 Aug. 2000, para. 62.
16. The UN-AU assessment identified the need for both civil affairs officers and military liaison officers (UN, 'Report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur', paras 66-8, 76).
17. AMIS's mandate was contained in the Addis Ababa Agreement on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers of 28 May 2004, and was expanded by the AU PSC to include a limited protection element in October 2004.
18. Victoria Holt and Tobias Berkman, The impossible mandate? Military preparedness, the responsibility to protect and modern peace operations (Washington DC : Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006).
19. International Crisis Group, 'Darfur's fragile peace agreement', policy briefing, 10 June 2006.
20. Holt and Berkman, The impossible mandate?, ch. 8.
21. Jim Terrie, 'Military options for Darfur', in David Mepham and Alexander Ramsbotham, eds, Darfur: the responsibility to protect (Pretoria and London: Institute of Social Studies/Institute for Public Policy Research, 2006), p. 36.
22. Anthony Lake, Susan Rice and Donald Payne, 'We saved Europeans. Why not Africans?', Washington Post, 2 Oct. 2006.
23. de Waal, 'Darfur's deadline', at p. 276.
24. Laurie Nathan, 'The making and unmaking of the Darfur Peace Agreement', in de Waal, ed., War in Darfur and the search for peace, pp. 245-66.
25. Nathan, 'The making and unmaking of the Darfur Peace Agreement'.
26. UN, 'Report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur'.
27. The DPA makes reference only to AMIS, but this embraces its successor UNAMID also. In this and the following paragraphs, AMIS refers to AMIS and its successor.
28. Darfur Peace Agreement, paras 334-40.
29. Darfur Peace Agreement, paras 446-7. Given also that the reform of these institutions was entrusted to a body, the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission, headed by a nominee of the movements, this provision was rightly seen by the government delegation as the single most substantial threat to its military control of Darfur. Contrary to the DPA, this commission has subsequently been headed by a Sudanese armed forces general officer.
30. Conventional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities, focusing on the armed movements, are contained in the joint UN-AU proposals (UN, 'Report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur', paras 85-7).
31. UN, 'Report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur', para. 55(b)(iii).
32. It is, however, difficult to envisage how UN police would have fulfilled their tasks in the context of a non-consensual deployment.
33. UN, 'Report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur', paras 82-7. The UN and AU also requested (in para. 82) a mandate that would allow them to promote the reform of the Sudanese police service.
34. These concerned the status of foreign combatants, the identity of the head of the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission, and the number of the movements' combatants to be integrated into the army. See de Waal, 'Darfur's deadline'.
35. Subsequently the JEM's and Abdel Wahid's positions hardened.