Auction choice

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 25, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 1269-1298

  Li, Huagang ^a,b   Riley, John G ^a,b  

^a Credit Suisse USA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetry; Auctions; Revenue

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS; FUNCTION EVALUATION; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; RISK ANALYSIS;

AUCTION CHOICE; ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE; REVENUE RANKINGS; RISK AVERSION;

EARNINGS;

EID: 35448961569     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.10.003     Document Type: Article

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