Government deficits, political inefficiency, and fiscal reconstruction in Japan

Annals of Economics and Finance

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 169-183

  Doi, Takero ^a,b   Ihori, Toshihiro ^c   Kondo, Hiroki ^d  

^a KEIO UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

^d SHINSHU UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Fiscal reconstruction; Government deficits; Political inefficiency

Indexed keywords

EID: 3543034393     PISSN: 15297373     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Alesina, A. and A. Drazen, 1991, Why are stabilization delayed? American Economic Review 81, 1170-1188.
2. Becker, G. S. and C. B. Mulligan, 1998, Deadweight costs and the size of government. NBER working paper 6789.
3. Boadway, R., Pestieau, P., and D. Wildasin, 1989, Tax-transfer policy and the voluntary provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics 39, 157-176.
4. Chari, V. V. and H. Cole, 1993, Why are representative democracies fiscally irresponsible?, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department Staff Report 163.
5. Ihori, T. and J. Itaya, 2001, A dynamic model of fiscal reconstruction. European Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming.
6. Velasco, A., 1997, A model of endogenous fiscal deficits and delayed fiscal reforms. NBER Working Paper 6336.