Beveridge versus Bismarck public-pension systems in integrated markets

Regional Science and Urban Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 649-669

  Kolmar, Martin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Market integration; Pension systems; System competition

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); PENSION SYSTEM; SUSTAINABILITY; SYSTEMS ANALYSIS;

EID: 35349025295     PISSN: 01660462     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2007.01.003     Document Type: Article

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