Luck, leverage, and equality: A bargaining problem for luck egalitarians

Philosophy and Public Affairs

Volumn 35, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 266-292

  Seligman, Matthew ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 35348990233     PISSN: 00483915     EISSN: 10884963     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1088-4963.2007.00111.x     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Arneson, Rakowski, Cohen, and Dworkin are among the most prominent luck egalitarians, though Dworkin himself rejects the label. I consider a paradigmatic luck egalitarian view that may not be attributable to any one luck egalitarian in particular. For important critiques of luck egalitarianism, see Elizabeth Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?" Ethics 109 (1999): 287-337
2. and Samuel Scheffler, "What Is Egalitarianism?" Philosophy & Public Affairs 31 (2003): 5-39.
3. This class of theories was inspired by Rawls's informal argument for his Principles of Justice. The informal argument claims that some factors that affect distributions are "arbitrary from a moral point of view," and therefore cannot justify inequalities. His Difference Principle, however, maximizes the position of the worst-off without regard to the source of inequalities. Thus distributions endorsed by the Difference Principle may have inequalities that derive from mere luck, as long as that distributionmaximizes the ex ante expectations of the worst-off group. These inequalities are justified, according to Rawls, even though the members of the worst-off group may have landed in that position because of morally arbitrary factors. On this view, justice consists in the structure of the distribution rather than in the antecedent factors in an individual agent's life that generated it. Thus, for Rawls, the aim of preventing morally arbitrary factors from affecting the material prospects of individuals is secondary to the aim of ensuring that the distribution satisfies the Difference Principle.
4. There are some respects, of course, in which people living in a Rawlsian society would be insulated from misfortune. For example, a basic structure that satisfies the Two Principles would presumably insulate poor people from the effects of natural disasters. There will also be elements of chance that the basic structure will not cancel out. So it seems that a Rawlsian society diverges from the luck egalitarian principle, at least in some cases. More fundamentally, the justification for the Difference Principle is not that it counteracts misfortune. The relation between Rawls's view and luck egalitarianism is beyond the scope of this article; see Scheffler, "What Is Egalitarianism?" for a more thorough treatment.
5. Given the availability of insurance, we may be less inclined to help those who have chosen not to insure. In doing so, we hold them accountable for their decision not to purchase insurance, not for the natural disaster.
6. G.A. Cohen, "Onthe Currency of Egalitarian Justice," Ethics 99 (1989): 906-44, atp. 934.
7. I will often refer to this conception as a "metaphysical" conception of choice. This follows Cohen and others, but the term simply refers to a prepolitical conception of choice from the philosophy of action. This prepolitical conception of choice may be libertarian or compatibilist; the only requirement is that the conception be grounded in individual agency rather than in political justice.
8. The coherence and stability of the distinction between choice and chance has been questioned before. For example, see Peter Vallentyne's review of Phillipe Van Parijs's Real Freedom for All, in Ethics 107 (1997): 321-43.
9. An Editor of Philosophy & Public Affairs suggested this perspicuous formulation.
10. As I have described the situation, there are no inequalities in resources. Alternatively, we can set up the case using a welfare metric. See n. 11 for the translation. Henceforth in the text I will speak in terms of resources, with the understanding that the same problem applies to a welfare theory.
11. Choices made under duress are generally not considered to be binding, and those who make choices under duress not responsible for the consequences. The reason for this, however, is not that such choices fail to qualify as legitimate choices. Instead, it is precisely the circumstances under which these choices are made, rather than the metaphysical status of the choice itself, that blocks the moral responsibility of the agent. See David Zimmerman, "Coercive Wage Offers," Philosophy & Public Affairs 10 (1981): 121-45. In Section V, I will present an argument that leverage can block responsibility for distributive outcomes, but that this is not because leveraged choices are metaphysically deficient. That argument applies similarly to choices made under duress. See n. 28.
12. The case in welfare terms is as follows: Due to option luck, Gates has more welfare than others. If no deal is struck, both parties will have lower welfare than they would have if a deal were made. Gates's welfare will be just high rather than very high. The others' welfare will be very low rather than merely low. Gates can live with just high welfare, but the others would much prefer lowwelfare to very low welfare. Thus Gates's bargaining position is better, and he can hold out for an advantageous deal.
13. To arrive at this distribution, suppose in the period after the bargain everyone produces forty units each. Gates would then have twenty units from prior to the bargain, minus the nine units of whale meat he gave the others, plus forty he produced post-bargain plus twenty each from his half of the nine others' production, for a total of 231. The other survivors would each have six from prior to the bargain, plus one of whale meat, plus twenty from their half of their own production, for a total of twenty-seven.
14. Or, more precisely, is the Council acting justly in allowing this distribution? From now on, I will save words by speaking of the distribution as just or unjust. The precise reader should keep in mind that according to most luck egalitarians the appropriate target for justice is the institutions that create and allow distributions, rather than those distributions themselves.
15. Most luck egalitarians would say that they were mistreated by the Council, since the state is the proper target of justice. Cohen, in contrast, would likely say that they are mistreated both by the Council and by Gates.
16. The further inequality also derives from the conditions that made Gates's leverage possible, including the potential hunger of the other survivors. This point will become relevant as the discussion progresses.
17. Henceforth, 'just' and 'unjust' are abbreviations for 'just on egalitarian grounds' and 'unjust on egalitarian grounds'.
18. Again, I delay discussion of contractual duress until Section VI.
19. There is a sense in which Gates's good option luck is good brute luck for the survivors; if he had not caught the whale, he would have no food to trade them and they would all be uncomfortably hungry. So the bad brute luck they suffered is when Gates decided to leverage them.
20. Cohen, "Expensive Taste Rides Again." A connoisseur may be responsible for a preference for champagne, but not for the fact that champagne is so expensive.
21. See also Colin McLeod, Liberalism, Justice, and the Markets: A Critique of Liberal Equality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
22. I will address this line of argument in Section IV.
23. See Scheffler, "What Is Egalitarianism?" p. 13.
24. One way to understand the luck egalitarian strategy is to see them as proposing a different mapping between subjective and objective choice. I will avoid this formulation, and instead talk of them reformulating their substantive conception of subjective choice and chance, and consequently affecting the objective distinction while retaining the intuitive mapping. This is the most plausible route for the luck egalitarian, and also reflects the trend in the literature to revise the subjective conception of choice.
25. I will henceforth omit "in the objective sense." Mention of choice, chance, and luck is presumed to be in the objective sense unless otherwise stated.
26. There were two other groups of people that generated most of the supply of indentured servants. Those who owed large amounts of money, and their families, used it to avoid debtors' prison, and those convicted of capital crimes could escape their death sentence by becoming indentured. Whether these groups constitute instances of bargaining leverage is unclear, and these complications are best avoided in this discussion.
27. Richard Middleton, Colonial America: A History, 1565-1776 (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002). There is a crucial difference between such cases of indentured servitude and the bargaining problem. One can plausibly claim that the case of indentured servitude arose due to prior violations of egalitarian justice, which in turn generated social and economic inequalities that made exploitation possible. There is no such tainted history in the case of the bargaining problem.
28. David Hume, "Of the Original Contract," Essays Moral, Political and Literary (1752).
29. I will consider the prospects for such an account more carefully in Section VI.
30. A similar argument can be made in the case of choices made under duress. In particular, Gates's proposal counts as an exploitative offer, using Zimmerman's terminology. There is no reason to think that such offers in any way undermine the agency of the exploited party, even if one believes that coercive threats and coercive offers do sometimes undermine it.
31. Ari Weinstein suggested this example to me.
32. This objection is strengthened by the fact that vulnerability to bargaining leverage is roughly proportional to the level of desperation of the weaker party. The survivors in the bargaining problem are vulnerable to Gates's bargaining leverage because they are faced with uncomfortable hunger, which makes them relatively desperate. If, however, the trade did not concern food but rather DVD players, presumably their level of desperation would be much lower. In light of their lower level of desperation, they would be unwilling to make trades that would so radically favor Gates.
33. The bargaining problem is, unlike actual economic history, free from the intervention of chance. Nonetheless, it is clear enough that bargaining leverage has influenced actual economic activity, even if we cannot attribute all unjust inequality to it.