The role of risk in franchising

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 2, Issue 1-2, 1995, Pages 39-74

  Lafontaine, Francine ^a   Bhattacharyya, Sugato ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency; Contracts; Franchising; Risk

Indexed keywords

EID: 35348963391     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0929-1199(95)00004-R     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. Analysis of Survival Rates Among Franchise and Independent Small Business Startups
2. Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts
3. The Choice of Organizational Form: The Case of Franchising
4. Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising
5. Aversion to Risk Aversion in the New Institutional Economics
6. Costs of Control: The Source of Economic Rents for McDonald's Franchisees
7. Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results
8. Contractual Arrangements as Signaling Devices: Evidence from Franchising
9. Improving Channel Coordination Through Franchising
10. Effects of Alternative Tax Structures on Individuals' Holdings of Financial Assets
11. Assets, Prices and Monetary Theory
12. Franchising and Risk Management
13. The Economics of Franchise Contracts
14. Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity
15. Why Firms Franchise: A Search Cost Theory
16. An Empirical Look at Franchising as an Organizational Form
17. The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract
18. The use of initial fees and royalties in business-format franchising
19. Franchise Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution
20. A Comparison of Business Discontinuations in States With and Without Franchise Termination Laws