Optimal clearing of supply/demand curves

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2518 LNCS, Issue , 2002, Pages 600-611

  Sandholm, Tuomas ^a   Suri, Subhash ^b  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

^b University of California   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPLICATION AREA; COMPUTATION COMPLEXITY; COORDINATION MECHANISMS; DISCRIMINATORY PRICING; MARKET CLEARING; PIECEWISE LINEAR; POLYNOMIAL-TIME ALGORITHMS; SUPPLY AND DEMAND;

COMMERCE; COSTS; ECONOMICS; OPTIMIZATION; PIECEWISE LINEAR TECHNIQUES; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; PROFITABILITY; ALGORITHMS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

ALGORITHMS; OPTIMIZATION;

EID: 35348949188     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-36136-7_52     Document Type: Conference Paper

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