Aesthetic principles

British Journal of Aesthetics

Volumn 43, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 114-125

  Conolly, Oliver ^a   Haydar, Bashshar ^a  

^a AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT   (Lebanon)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35348814362     PISSN: 00070904     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.2.114     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. The main proponent of illusionism is Arnold Isenberg, in 'Critical Communication' [henceforth CCJ, in Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley (eds), The Philosophy of Art (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), ch. 26, pp. 363-373.
2. originally published in Philosophical Review, vol. 58 (1949).
3. Mary Mothersill defends illusionism in 'Critical Reasons', Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 11 (1961), pp. 74-78.
4. Wc have done our scholarly duty, and confirm that this is probably the case: see Ludwig Goldscheider, El Greco: Paintings, Drawings and Sculptures, 3rd edn (London: Phaidon Press, 1954), PP. 12-13.
5. The point is made by F. A. Seigler in 'On Isenberg's "Critical Communication'", British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 8 (1968), no. 2, pp. 161-174.
6. The thesis is defended in, for instance Stuart Hampshire, 'Logic and Appreciation', in William Elton (ed.), Aesthetics and Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), ch. 10, pp. 161-169.
7. and James Shelley, 'The Character and Role of Principles in the Evaluation of Art', British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 42 (2002), no. 1, pp. 37-51.
8. Sibley, who holds this view, points out that this phenomenon is distinct from defeasibility: 'With defeasibility, inherently positive features never become negative in a particular instance: duress may defeat a contract, but offer and acceptance never count against a contract. But where there is possible interaction in a complex whole, as in art-works, what in vacuo is inherently an aesthetic merit may itself, in conjunction with other inherently positive features in that complex, become a defect': F. Sibley 'General Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics' [henceforth GCRA], in Approach to Aesthetics (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 2001), ch. 8, pp. 104-118.
9. (originally published in Essays on Aesthetics: Perspectives on the Work of Monroe C. Beardsley, ed. John Fisher [Philadelphia: Temple U.P., 1983], p. 107).
10. George Dickie calls it the 'Sibley test for aesthetic polarity': 'Beardsley, Sibley, and Critical Principles' [henceforth BSCP], Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 46 (1987), pp. 229-237 at p. 234.
11. Sibley does not draw this particular distinction: he draws a distinction between merit-properties and merit-responsible properties, both in ethics and aesthetics ('Particularity, Art, and Evaluation', Approach to Aesthetics, ch. 7, pp. 88-103.
12. (originally published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol, 48 [1974], at pp. 96-98). The difference between our distinction and Sibley's is that Sibley thinks that merit-properties can become defects, and it is precisely this that we question.
13. Strawson considers wittincss to be an inherently positive property, 'Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art', in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1974), pp. 178-188 at pp. 187-188.
14. Whereas Beardsley thinks funniness is inherently neutral, 'On the Generality of Critical Reasons' [henceforth OGCR], in M.J. Wreen and D. M. Cullen (eds), The Aesthetic Point of View (London: Cornell U.P., 1982), ch. 12, pp. 208-218 at p. 215; Sibley thinks it is positively valenced but reversible (GCRA, pp. 108-109).
15. John E. MacKinnon claims that 'in the case of verdicts, reversals occur in the value attributed to certain features because of the interactive nature of aesthetic value concepts' ('Heroism and Reversal: Sibley on Aesthetic Supervenience', in Emily Brady and Jerrold Levinson [eds], Aesthetic Concepts: Essays after Sibley [Oxford: Oxford U.P., 2001], pp. 81-99 at p. 90). James Shelley claims that 'the Sibleyan account, unlike the Humean, acknowledges the particularist truth that no property is everywhere a merit' ('The Character and Role of Principles in the Evaluation of Art', p. 43). Malcolm Budd claims that 'properties that are aesthetically valuable in themselves - inherent aesthetic merit-constituting properties-can be combined together in a work of art in an incongruous manner, so that they do not enhance or support one another, but one diminishes or clashes with another, revealing a lack of clarity in the artist's aim or a mistaken conception of how to achieve that aim' ('Aesthetic Judgements, Aesthetic Principles and Aesthetic Properties', European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 7 [1999], no. 3, pp. 295-311 at PP. 303-304). None give examples.
16. The argument is advanced by Michael Scriven, Primary Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 57-59.
17. and is refuted by Sibley in GCRA, pp. 115-118, whose argument is summarized here.
18. Such a form of hierarchical irreversible generalism should not be confused with Beardsley's version of irreversible generalism, stated in OGCR and 'The Discrimination of Aesthetic Enjoyment', British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 3 (1963), pp. 291-300,
19. F. R. Leavis, 'Reality and Sincerity', in The Living Principle (Chicago: Elephans, 1998), pp. 125-134.