Modeling adversaries in a logic for security protocol analysis

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2629, Issue , 2003, Pages 115-132

  Halpern, Joseph Y ^a   Pucella, Riccardo ^a  

^a Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER CIRCUITS; RECONFIGURABLE HARDWARE;

ADVERSARY MODELING; ADVERSARY MODELS; DOLEV-YAO ADVERSARY; DOLEV-YAO MODEL; SECURITY PROTOCOL ANALYSIS; SECURITY PROTOCOLS; SPECIFIC INFORMATION; SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE;

NETWORK SECURITY;

EID: 35248868917     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-40981-6_11     Document Type: Article

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