MFI's clients borrowing strategies and lending groups financial heterogeneity under progressive lending: Evidence from rural Mexico

Savings and Development

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 193-216

  Morvant, Solène ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LUMIÈRE LYON 2   (France)

Author keywords

Group homogeneity; Latin America; Mexico; Microcredit; Microfinance; Progressive lending

Indexed keywords

CREDIT PROVISION; FINANCIAL SYSTEM; LENDING BEHAVIOR; MICROFINANCE;

LATIN AMERICA; MEXICO [NORTH AMERICA]; NORTH AMERICA;

EID: 35248849408     PISSN: 03934551     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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