Tax competition among municipal governments: Exit versus voice

Urban Affairs Review

Volumn 43, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 221-255

  Hendrick, Rebecca ^a   Yonghong, Wu ^a   Jacob, Benoy ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Municipal government; Tax competition

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); METROPOLITAN AREA; NEIGHBORHOOD; PROPERTY MARKET; TAX SYSTEM; URBAN ECONOMY;

CHICAGO; ILLINOIS; NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 35148866664     PISSN: 10780874     EISSN: 15528332     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1078087407305312     Document Type: Article

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