BITs and bargains: Strategic aspects of bilateral and multilateral regulation of foreign investment

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 291-311

  Bubb, Ryan J ^a   Rose Ackerman, Susan ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bilateral investment treaties; Customary international law; Foreign direct investment; Multilateral investment agreement; Prisoner's dilemma

Indexed keywords

EID: 35148851904     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2007.07.005     Document Type: Article

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