The insecurity problem: Tackling unbounded data

Proceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 370-384

  Fröschl, Sibylle ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONSTRAINT THEORY; DATA REDUCTION; SECURITY OF DATA;

INSECURITY PROBLEM; NATURAL RESTRICTIONS; NEXPTIME;

PROBLEM SOLVING;

EID: 35048864875     PISSN: 19401434     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2007.32     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (14)

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