Deciding knowledge in security protocols under equational theories

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 3142, Issue , 2004, Pages 46-58

  Abadi, Martín ^a   Cortier, Véronique ^b  

^a University of California Santa Cruz   (United States)

^b LORIA   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTABILITY AND DECIDABILITY; CRYPTOGRAPHY; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

EQUATIONAL THEORY; FORMAL APPROACH; INDISTINGUISHABILITY; INDISTINGUISHABILITY RELATIONS; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; SECURITY PROTOCOLS;

NETWORK SECURITY;

EID: 35048822401     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-27836-8_7     Document Type: Article

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