Canons, cost, and competition in state supreme court elections

Judicature

Volumn 91, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 27-35

  Peters, C Scott ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34948873561     PISSN: 00225800     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (66)

1. 536 U.S. 765 (2002)
2. Deborah Goldberg et al., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 28. (New York: Justice at Stake Campaign, 2005). Accessed online at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/NewPolitics Report2004pdf (last visited Jan 29, 2007).
3. Id. at 29
4. Id. at 30
5. American Bar Association. Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. About the Commission: Background Paper, accessed online at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ about/background.html. (last visited 13 September 2006).
6. All discussion and quotes of model codes in this paragraph come from Brennan Center for Justice, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: (formerly known as Kelly) What Does the Decision Mean for the Future of State Judicial Elections? Accessed online at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/ dem_fc_lit_white_kellymemo.html (Last visited 13 September 2006).
7. Id.;
8. see also Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States are Responding to Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How judicial Elections are Changing, 38 AKRON L. REV. 625 (2005).
9. White, supra n. 1, at 788-789.
10. Caufield, supra n. 7, at 636.
11. American Bar Association, Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5, A(3)(d), accessed online at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/ canon_5.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
12. Brennan Center for Justice. Chart of State Canons of Judicial Conduct, http:// brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download _ file_9221.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
13. Caufield's attempts to explain state responses to the Supreme Court's decision are a notable exception. See Caufield, supra n. 7;
14. Rachel Caufield, Campaigning for Judge: How the Tone of Judicial Elections is Changing as a Result of White, in Matthew J. Streb, ed., RUNNING FOR JUDGE (New York: New York University Press, 2007) ;
15. see also Cynthia Gray, Developments Following Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, available at www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/ DevelopmentsafterWhite. pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2007); Brennan Center, supra n. 6.
16. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Circuit 2002).
17. Gray, supra n 12, at 7.
18. Kansas Judicial Watch v. Stout Civil Action Number 06-4056-JAR (July 19, 2006) ; Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (2004); Spargo v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.ed 65 (2nd Circuit 2003); North Dakota Family Alliance v. Bader 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (2005).
19. Carey v. Wolnitzek, No. 3:06-cv-00036, 2006 WL 2916814 (E.D. Ky. Oct 10, 2006)
20. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 416 F. 3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005).
21. Caufield, Campaigning for Judge, supra n 12.
22. Id.
23. According to Roy A. Schotland, Should Judges Be More Like Politicians? 39 CT. REV. 8 '(Spring 2002), 89% of all state appellate judges must sit for re-election at some point.
24. The American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States, accessed online at http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelectionCharts. pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
25. David B. Rottman, The White Decision in the Court of Opinion: View of Judges and the General Public. 39 CT. REV. 16 (2002).
26. Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860, 45 THE HISTORIAN 337 (1983).
27. For further examination of Hall's study, as well as an application of its findings to the debate over White, see Wendy R. Wieser, Issues Facing the Judiciary: Regulating Judges' Political Activity after 'White, 68 ALB. L. REV. 651 (2005).
28. Rottman, supra n, 22.
29. Phillip Dubois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH; JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNT-ABILITY, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980); Melinda Gann Hall and Chris W. Bonneau, "Mobilizing Interest: The Effects of Money on Ballot Roll-Off in State Supreme Court Elections, " paper presented at 2006 Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago IL.
30. Dubois, id.;
31. see also Lawrence Baum, The Electoral Frates of Incumbent Judges in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, 66 JUDICATURE 42 (1983);
32. Lawrence Baum, Explaining the Vote in Judicial Elections: The 1984 Ohio Supreme Court Elections, 40 WEST. POL. Q. 361 (1987).
33. Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr. and Charles H. Sheldon. Voters in Contested, Nonpartisan Judicial Elections: A Responsible Electorate or a Problematic Public? 36 WEST. POL. Q. 241 (1983).
34. Marie Hojnacki and Lawrence Baum, Choosing Judicial Candidates: How Voters Explain their Decisions, 75 JUDICATURE 300 (1992).
35. Marie Hojnacki and Lawrence Baum, NewStyle Judicial Campaigns and the Voters' Economic Issues and Union Members in Ohio, 45 WEST. POL. Q. 921 (1992).
36. Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr. and Charles H. Sheldon. Assessing Judicial Election: Effects upon the Electorate of High and Low Articulation Systems, 38 WEST. POL. Q. 276 (1985).
37. Owen G. Abbe and Paul S. Herrnson, How Judicial Election Campaigns Have Changed, 85 JUDICATURE 286 (2002).
38. Goldberg et al., supra n. 2, at 3-6. As a point of comparison, in the 1992 elections about 45% of a typical U.S. House campaign's budget was spent on television advertising. (Dwight Morris and Murielle E. Gamache, HANDBOOK OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING: MONEY IN THE 1992 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (Washington, D.C: CQ Press 1994)); In 2002, 90% of Senate races and 65% of all House races relied upon either broadcast or cable television advertising.
39. (Paul S. Herrnson, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT HOME AND IN WASHINGTON, 4th ed., 214-215. (Washington, D.C: CQ Press, 2004).
40. See, e.g., Lynda Kaird, Political Advertising: A Summary of Research Findings, in B. Newman, ed., THE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL MARKETING 423-438.
41. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999); Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar, GOING NEGATIVE: HOW ATTACK ADS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE (New York: Free Press, 1995).
42. Ansolabehere and Iyengar, id.
43. See, e.g., Samuel Patterson and Gregory A. Caldeira, Getting out the Vote: Participation in Gubernatorial Campaigns, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 675 (1993).
44. Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate? 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 829 (1994); Ansolabehere and Iyengar, supra n. 33;
45. Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Replicating Experiments Using Aggregate and Survey Data: The Case of Negative Advertising and Turnout, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 901 (1999)
46. Caufield, Campaigning For Judge, supra n. 12.
47. See, e.g., Gary C. Jacobson, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978);
48. Gary C.Jacobson, The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 334 (1990);
49. Donald P. Green and Jonathan S, Krasno, Rebuttal to Jacobson 's New Evidence for Old Arguments, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 363 (1990);
50. Donald P. Green, and Jonathan S. Krasno, Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 884 (1988);
51. Robert K. Goidel and Donald A. Gross, A Systems Approach to Campaign Finance in the U.S. House Elections, 22 AM. POL. Q. 125 (1994).
52. See, e.g., Anthony Gierzynski and David Breaux, Money and Votes in State Legislative Elections, 16 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 203 (1991);
53. Anthony Gierzynski and David Breaux, Legislative Elections and the Importance of Money, 21 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 337 (1996).
54. National Institute on Money in State Politics. Accessed online at www.followthemoney.org (last visited Feb. 14 2006).
55. Supra n. 11.
56. Gray, supra n. 12.
57. See, e.g., http://www.ajs.org/js/MN_ elections.htm.
58. Significant at the p<07 level in nonpartisan elections.
59. The dependent variable in the model of total spending is the natural log of total spending per 100,000 residents. This is a standard measurement in the literature on the effects of campaign spending, in recognition of the fact that the relationship between spending and other variables is rarely linear.
60. This is essentially the model offered in Melinda Gann Hall and Chris W. Bonneau, Does Quality Matter? Challengers in State Supreme Court Elections, 50 AM.J. POL. SCI. 20-33 (2006), with the addition of a variable for open seat elections and the variables for the canons of ethics.
61. With the exception of the ethical restrictions, these factors were offered to explain total campaign spending in Chris W. Bonneau, What PriceJustice(s)? Understanding Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections, 5 ST. POL. SC POL'Y Q. 107 (2005).
62. Races with open seats or vulnerable incumbents are more likely to be contested, as are races in electoral districts, where campaigning is presumably less demanding and less expensive, and in partisan systems, where parties traditionally help to lower the costs for candidates.
63. Significant at the p<10 and p<.07, respectively.
64. Significant at the p<.10 level.
65. Hall and Bonneau, supra n. 46.
66. Caufield, supra n. 12.