Collusion in second-price auctions under minimax regret criterion

Production and Operations Management

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 471-482

  Sošić, Greys ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Bidding rings; Budget balance; Collusion; Minimax regret

Indexed keywords

EID: 34948843629     PISSN: 10591478     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00273.x     Document Type: Article

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