Supervenience and object-dependent properties

Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 102, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 5-32

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EID: 34948842067     PISSN: 0022362X     EISSN: 19398549     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2005102128     Document Type: Review

References (20)

1. For more details see François Récanati, Direct Reference: From Language to Thought (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993).
2. See Kim, "Concepts of Supervenience," and "'Strong' and 'Global' Supervenience Revisited," in Supervenience and Mind (New York: Cambridge, 1993), pp. 53-78 and 79-91;
3. see also Bradford Petrie, "Global Supervenience and Reduction," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XLVIII (1987): 119-30.
4. See Kim, "'Strong' and 'Global' Supervenience Revisited." This, again, assumes generous closure conditions on properties.
5. A well-known sparse theory of properties is David Armstrong's, for example in Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989).
6. See Kim, "Concepts of Supervenience."
7. See, for example, Terence Horgan, "Supervenience and Microphysics," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, LXIII (1982): 29-43;
8. Kim, "Concepts of Supervenience," and "'Strong' and 'Global' Supervenience Revisited."
9. See Kim, "The Myth of Non-reductive Materialism," in Supervenience and Mind, pp. 265-84, pp. 277ff.
10. The argument has been criticized by R. Cranston Paull and Theodore Sider in "In Defense of Global Supervenience," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XLII (1992): 833-54;
11. and Robert Stalnaker in "Varieties of Supervenience," Philosophical Perspectives, × (1996): 221-41.
12. In ×'Strong' and 'Global' Supervenience Revisited.×
13. Locality considerations as strengthenings of supervenience principles were proposed by Horgan in "Supervenience and Microphysics," and "Form Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World," Mind, CII (1993): 555-86. His "regional supervenience" is more properly understood as a conditional locality principle, as explained below.
14. For example, in Robert Adams, "Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity," this JOURNAL, LXXVI, 1 (January 1979): 5-26.
15. For more on attempts to give definitions of "intrinsic property," see Stephen Yablo, "Intrinsicness," Philosophical Topics, XXVI (1998): 479-504;
16. or Rae Langton and David Lewis, "Defining 'Intrinsic'," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LVIII (1998): 333-45.
17. See Adams, "Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity," for a variety of historical references on these debates.
18. See Max Black, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," Mind, LXI (1952): 153-64;
19. Ian Hacking, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," this JOURNAL, LXXII, 9 (May 8, 1975): 249-56;
20. See Hacking, "The Identity of Indiscernibles," for the argument.