Wholesale access in multi-firm markets: When is it profitable to supply a competitor?

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 25, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 1026-1045

  Ordover, Janusz ^a   Shaffer, Greg ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Access pricing; Regulation; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; SUPPLY CHAINS;

ACCESS PRICING; POLICY MAKERS; VERTICAL INTEGRATION;

MARKETING;

EID: 34848837350     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.01.001     Document Type: Article

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