Values in pure and applied science

Foundations of Science

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 257-268

  Hansson, Sven Ove ^a  

^a ROYAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Applied science; Corpus; Epistemic values; Non epistemic values; Pure science; Scientific values; Values in science

Indexed keywords

APPLIED SCIENCE; CORPUS; EPISTEMIC VALUES; NON-EPISTEMIC VALUES; PURE SCIENCE; SCIENTIFIC VALUES; VALUES IN SCIENCE;

SOCIAL SCIENCES;

EID: 34848829755     PISSN: 12331821     EISSN: 15728471     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10699-007-9107-6     Document Type: Article

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