The political economy of conflict financing: A comprehensive approach beyond natural resources

Global Governance

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 427-444

  Wennmann, Achim ^a  

^a GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Conflict financing; Natural resources; Organized armed groups; Peacebuilding; Political economy of conflict

Indexed keywords

EID: 34748816219     PISSN: 10752846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-01303009     Document Type: Review

References (110)

1. See David Keen, The Economic Functions of Civil War, Adelphi Papers No. 320 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998);
2. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On the Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers 50 (1998): 563-573;
3. William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998);
4. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000);
5. Philippe Le Billon, The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know, Humanitarian Practice Network, Paper No. 33 (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2000);
6. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds., The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003);
7. Paul Collier, Lani Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003);
8. and Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper with Jonathan Goodhand, War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges and Transformations (London: Lynne Rienner, 2004). For critiques,
9. see Christopher Cramer, "Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War," World Development 11, no. 11 (2002): 1845-1864;
10. and Andrew Mack, "Civil War: Academic Research and the Policy Community," Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 5 (2002): 515-525.
11. Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War (New York: Vintage Books, 2000).
12. For an overview, see Michael Renner, The Anatomy of Resource Wars, WorldWatch Paper 162 (Washington, DC: WorldWatch Institute, 2002).
13. Philippe Le Billon, "The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict," Political Geography 20 (2001): 561-584;
14. Michael Ross, "What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?" Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 337-356;
15. Michael Ross, "Oil, Drugs and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil War," in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds., The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 47-70;
16. Ian Bannon and Paul Collier, eds., Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003).
17. Conflict financing is understood as the efforts of an organized armed group to resource the organization and conduct of armed conflict. The term organized armed group includes both rebel groups and government forces.
18. Keen, The Economic Functions of Civil War, pp. 9-11;
19. anonymous official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, interviewed by the author, Bern, 2 December 2003.
20. For some of the historical literature on war economies, see Charles Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993);
21. and Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). For the earlier work,
22. see François Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin, eds., Economie des Guerres Civil (Paris: Hachette, 1996);
23. and Joanna MacRae and Anthony Zwi, eds., War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies (London: Zed Books, 1994). For conflict diamonds,
24. see Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie, and Ralph Hazleton, The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security (Ottawa, ON: Partnership Africa Canada, 2000)
25. Two examples that are outside these agendas are Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999);
26. and Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (London: Zed Books, 2001).
27. Collier and Hoeffler, "On the Economic Causes of Civil War"; Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap;
28. Bannon and Collier, Natural Resources and Violent Conflict. See also note 12.
29. Berdal and Malone, Greed and Grievance;
30. Ballentine and Sherman, The Political Economy of Armed Conflict;
31. Pugh and Cooper with Goodhand, War Economies in a Regional Context.
32. The relationship between local and conflict economies has received less attention. An exception is Musifiky Mwanasali, "The View from Below," in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 137-153.
33. For example, Collier's work shifted from motives toward opportunity structures of rebel groups.
34. See Ballentine and Sherman, The Political Economy of Armed Conflict, pp. 4, 259-260;
35. and Cramer, "Homo Economicus Goes to War," p. 185.
36. See Keen, The Economic Functions of Civil War, p. 12.
37. See Frances Steward, "The Root Causes of Humanitarian Emergencies," in Wayne Nafziger, Frances Stewart, and Raimo Väyrynen, eds., The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies: War and Displacement in Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 6-15.
38. See notes 3 and 4.
39. Charles Anderton, "Economic Theorizing of Conflict: Historical Contributions, Future Possibilities," Defence and Peace Economics (April 2002): 87-108;
40. Michael Shafer, "Mineral Myths," Foreign Policy 47 (1982): 154-171;
41. Jock A. Finlayson and David G. Haglund, "Whatever Happened to the Resource War?" Survival 29, no. 5 (1987): 403-415;
42. John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (1977): 1212-1241;
43. Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict," International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 5-40;
44. Nils Peter Gleditsch, "Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature," Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 3 (1998): 381-400.
45. J. Fairhead, "The Conflict over Natural and Environmental Resources," in Wayne Nafziger, Frances Stewart, and Raimo Väyrynen, eds., The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies: War and Displacement in Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 151.
46. Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry Holt, 2001), p. 14-22, 215-217.
47. Paul Collier, "Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective," in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in 20 Wars (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 96.
48. For a critique of Collier's proxies, see Cramer, "Homo Economicus Goes to War," pp. 1847-1854.
49. R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 80-81.
50. Ibid., pp. 58, 65-70;
51. Elisabeth Picard, "Liban: La Matrice Historique," in François Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin, eds., Economie des Guerres Civil (Paris: Hachette, 1996), pp. 76-84;
52. Philippe Le Billon, "Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000," African Affairs 100 (2001): 62.
53. See Kaldor, New and Old Wars, pp. 33, 46-48.
54. Ross, "What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?" pp. 338, 340.
55. The typology is based on four geographic characteristics (resources are concentrated/diffuse or proximate/distant to the capital) and four types of armed conflict (competition for state control, secession, rebellion, and warlordism).
56. See Le Billon, The Political Ecology of War, p. 573.
57. Ibid., pp. 572-575.
58. Lootability refers to the ease with which resources can be extracted and transported by individuals or gangs (diamonds, drugs). Obstructability refers to the ease with which the transportation of a resource can be blocked (oil, gas, deep-shaft minerals).
59. See Ross, "Oil, Drugs and Diamonds," pp. 54, 64-67.
60. Ross, "What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?" p. 352.
61. Don Hubert, "Resources, Greed, and the Persistence of Violent Conflict," in Rob McRae and Don Hubert, eds., Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), pp. 178-179.
62. See Le Billon, The Political Economy of War, p. 1.
63. See Lauretta Napoleoni, Terror Inc: Tracing the Money Behind Global Terrorism (London: Penguin, 2004), pp. 14-62.
64. Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, pp. 74-76.
65. Barnett R. Rubin, "The Political Economy of War and Peace," World Development 28, no. 10 (2000): 1795-1796;
66. Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, "The Dangers of Devolution: The Hidden Economies of Armed Conflict," in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation (Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions Press, 1999), p. 61.
67. For the example of Uganda, see UN Security Council, Addendum to the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2001/1072 (13 November 2001), pars. 115-117.
68. See Neil Cooper, "Conflict Goods: The Challenges for Peacekeeping and Conflict Prevention," International Peacekeeping 8, no. 3 (2001): 27;
69. and Neil Cooper, "State Collapse as Business: The Role of Conflict Trade and Their Emerging Control Agenda," Development and Change 33, no. 5 (2002): 936.
70. Jackie Cilliers and Dietrich Christian, eds., Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2000);
71. UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2001/357 (12 April 2001).
72. Michael Ross, Booty Futures: Africa's Civil Wars and the Futures Market for Natural Resources, available at www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/ ross/bootyfutures.pdf.
73. Nay lor, Wages of Crime, p. 59.
74. Fabrice Weissman, "Mozambique: La 'Guerre du Ventre,'" in François Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin, eds., Economie des Guerres Civil, p. 332.
75. Naylor, Wages of Crime, p. 52.
76. Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap, pp. 84-85.
77. Aline Angoustures and Valérie Pascal, "Diasporas et Financement des Conflits," in François Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin, eds., Economie des Guerres Civil, pp. 498-506;
78. Rohan Gunaratna, "Sri Lanka: Feeding the Tamil Tigers," in Ballentine and Sherman, The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, pp. 19-223.
79. Karen Ballentine, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflict," in Ballentine and Sherman, The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, pp. 263-264, 279.
80. Jean-Christophe Rufin, "Les Economies des Guerres dans les Conflits Internes," in François Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin, eds., Economie des Guerres Civil, p. 29.
81. Andrew Parker, Mark Huband, and Francesco Guerrera, "The Deadly Scramble for Diamonds in Africa," Financial Times, 10 July 2000, p. 6;
82. Marc Roche, "Lev Leviev, Un Franc-Tireur Des Gemmes Africains En Chasse Sur Les Terres De La De Beers," Le Monde, 5 July 2001, p. 2.
83. Ross, Booty Futures, pp. 19-20.
84. Jeremy McDermott, "Kidnapping Increases in Latin America," Jane's Intelligence Review 15 (June 2003): 26-30.
85. Collier et al, Breaking the Conflict Trap, pp. 77-78.
86. Cooper, "State Collapse as Business," pp. 941-942.
87. Naylor, Wages of Crime, pp. 78-79.
88. UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA, UN Doc. S/2000/203 (10 March 2000).
89. Rufin, "Les Economies des Guerres dans les Conflits Internes," pp. 58-59.
90. See Frances Steward and Valpy Fitzgerald, "Introduction: Assessing the Economie Costs of War," in Frances Steward, Valpy Fitzgerald, and Associates, War and Development: The Economic and Social Consequences of Conflict, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 8-9;
91. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (London: Longman, 2001), pp. 7, 11;
92. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Hemel Hempstead, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 112-114.
93. See Ballentine, "Beyond Greed and Grievance," pp. 278-279;
94. and R. T. Naylor, Economic Warfare: Sanctions, Embargo Busting and Their Human Cost (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999).
95. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," American Political Science Review 91, no. 1 (2003): 80-81;
96. Ballentine, "Beyond Greed and Grievance," pp. 264-266.
97. P. W. Singer, "Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security," International Security 26, no. 2 (2001): 186-220;
98. David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, Adelphi Papers No. 316 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998).
99. Mark Duffield, "Globalisation, Transborder Trade, and War Economies," in Berdal and Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, pp. 69-90.
100. See Global Witness, Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification and Control of Diamonds (London: Global Witness, 2000).
101. Mark Duffield, "Globalisation, Transborder Trade, and War Economies," pp. 85-86.
102. Ballentine, "Beyond Greed and Grievance," p. 278.
103. Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," pp. 75, 78;
104. Barbara F. Walter, "Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War," Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 371-388.
105. Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," p. 88.
106. Achim Wennmann, "Resourcing the Recurrence of Intrastate Conflict: Parallel Economies and Their Implications for Peacebuilding," Security Dialogue 36, no. 4 (2005): 379-494.
107. See Spyros Demetriou, Politics from the Barrel of a Gun: Small Arms Proliferation in the Republic of Georgia (1989-2001) (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2002).
108. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, "Estimates by U.S. See More Rebels with More Funds," New York Times, 22 October 2004, p. 1.
109. Naylor, Wages of Crime, pp. 78-79.
110. S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, Political Economy of Internal Conflict in Sri Lanka, Working Paper Series, Conflict Research Unit (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2003), Working Paper 16, pp. 96-97.