The inverted cycle: Kabul and the strongmen's competition for control over Kandahar, 2001-2006

Central Asian Survey

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 167-184

  Giustozzi, Antonio ^a   Ullah, Noor ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC IMPACT; ETHNOPOLITICS; POLITICAL POWER;

AFGHANISTAN; ASIA; EURASIA; KABUL [AFGHANISTAN]; KANDAHAR; SOUTH ASIA;

EID: 34548758426     PISSN: 02634937     EISSN: 14653354     Source Type: Trade Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/02634930701517375     Document Type: Article

References (85)

1. See A. Giustozzi, 'Genesis of a "prince'", Working Paper 4, Series 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics (LSE), 2006
2. A. Giustozzi, 'The demodernisation of an army: Northern Afghanistan 1992-1998', Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol 15, No 1, 2004, pp 45-67
3. G. Peake, 'From warlords to peacelords?', Journal of International Affairs, Vol 56, 2003, pp 181-192
4. Thomas H. Johnson, 'Ismail Khan, Herat, and Iranian Influence', Strategic Insights, Vol 3, No 7, 2004, at http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/jul/johnsonJul04withpictures.pdf (last accessed 12 July 2007)
5. G. Dietl, 'War, peace and the warlords: The case of Ismail Khan of Herat in Afghanistan', Alternatives, Vol 3, No 2-3, 2004, pp 41-66.
6. This paper is based on Noor Ullah's experience as UN official in Kandahar after 2002 and on A. Giustozzi's interviews with local participants and observers in 2005 and 2006. Given the predominance of oral sources in a context of ongoing political and military conflict, wherever possible the authors have tried to use multiple sources to check the reliability of the information received. In order to reduce the possibility of being fed biased information, in interviewing, preference has been given to individuals who were in a position to observe the events closely, but without being directly involved.
7. See A. Giustozzi, 'The debate on warlordism', Discussion paper 13, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, 2005.
8. For a discussion of terms in this context see A. Giustozzi and N. Ullah, 'Tribes and warlords in southern Afghanistan', Working Paper series 2, No 7, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, 2006.
9. M. Sahlins, 'The segmentary lineage: An organisation of predatory expansion', American Anthopologist, Vol 80, No 1, 1961, pp 53-70.
10. See also B. Glatzer, 'Centre and periphery in Afghanistan: New identities in a broken state', Sociologus, winter 2002, pp 107-124.
11. Glatzer, op cit, Ref 5.
12. See Ref 4 above. That tribal leaders turned into large landlords is generally accepted. Some authors, particularly Soviet ones, talk of a transition to 'feudalism' to describe the process, while others do not accept the use of this term in this context.
13. For a more detailed discussion, see Giustozzi, op cit, Ref 3.
14. ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
15. R. Tapper, 'Introduction' and B. Glatzer, 'Political organisation of Pashtun nomads and the state', in Richard Tapper (ed.), The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan (London: Croom Helm, 1983).
16. On the attraction of the Persian state model over Pashtun tribal leaders, see also T. Barfield, 'Establishing legitimacy in Afghanistan', Iranian Studies, Vol 37, No 2, 2004, pp 269-270.
17. Tribal aristocracy is defined in the case of Afghanistan as the upper strata of the Barakzai and Popolzai tribes, including the royal families and those related to them by kin. The aristocracy maintained relations with the khan families, often directly or otherwise mediated through the state institutions.
18. Strictly speaking, the cycle of Ibn-Khaldun applies only at the state level (personal communication with Bernt Glatzer, March 2006), but is adopted here as a model to explain patterns of power in the provinces.
19. On this topic see B. R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), pp 196-203.
20. As well as the Mohammadzais, this is the sub-tribe of King Zahir Shah. However, it will not be discussed in this paper as it is today mainly based in Kabul and plays little role in Kandahar's politics.
21. Interview with Ustad Abdul Haleem, Kandahar, January 2006.
22. Interview with former commanders of Kandahar province, Kandahar, January 2006.
23. Information gathered by Noor Ullah during his tenure as UN official.
24. For different accounts of this see P. Tomsen, 'Statement on Afghanistan: in pursuit of security and democracy', Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, 16 October 2003
25. The New York Times Magazine, 6 January 2002
26. 'Altered states', Newsline, January 2002.
27. On the sources of Achakzai military power, see Giustozzi, op cit, Ref 4. The main military power in Kandahar was the Alkozai strongmen, but during the early phases of US intervention they were still aligned with the Taleban.
28. Human Rights Watch, 'Afghanistan: Return of the warlords', Briefing Paper, New York, June 2002, p 18. 182
29. On press reports of these events see 'Washington mit der Afghanistan-Konferenz zufrieden', Neue Zur̈cher Zeitung, 10 December 2001
30. 'Afghan fighters close in on Bin Laden, Squabble over Kandahar', People's Daily, 9 December, 2001.
31. These developments were reported in the press, see for example The Washington Post, 16 January 2002; The Independent, 14 January 2002.
32. A press report is in Balochistan Post, 17 July 2002
33. personal communication with UN official, Kabul,October 2006.
34. Interviews with local officials and tribal leaders, Kandahar, May 2005. For press reports see Newsline, January 2002
35. EurasiaNet, 21 April 2003.
36. Interviews with tribal leaders in Herat, October 2004 and November 2005
37. The Washington Post, 16 January 2002
38. IWPR, 'Afghan Recovery Report', No 61, 23 May 2003, IWPR, London.
39. This included the provinces of Zabul, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Helmand and Nimruz.
40. One of two major custom collection points on the border with Pakistan, the other one being Torkham in Nangarhar province. Kandahar province was contributing about US$19 million a year to Kabul's coffers in 2004, with leakage estimated at 30 per cent. In 2002 revenue must however have been significantly less.
41. Interviews with notables and officials, Kandahar, March 2005
42. S. Chayes, 'Dedicated to Sarah Chayes', The Transom Review, Vol 3, No 6, 2003, at http://wwww.transom.org/guests/review/ 200310.review.chayes.html (accessed 12 July 2007)
43. S. Chayes, 'Rebuilding Akokolacha', The Christian Science Monitor, 11 December 2002
44. S. Chayes, 'On the ground, no stability', interview on Afghan Independent Radio, 20 August 2003, at http://talk.transom.org/ WebX?1474.ZTrial14fLo.141053_meeaf8bb/0 (accessed 12 July 2007).
45. See Giustozzi and Ullah, op cit, 2006, p 9.
46. UN sources, Kabul, April 2003 and October 2003.
47. UN and AIHRC officials, Kandahar, May 2005 and January 2006.
48. Press reports in Frontier Post, 25 January 2002
49. Newsweek Web, 21 February 2002, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3067273/ site/newsweek/from/RL.1/ (accessed 12 July 2007).
50. Interview with UN officials, December 2004. Ismail Khan himself accused minister Arif Noorzai rather than Gul Agha, see The Times, 25 August 2004.
51. Interviews with UN officials and members of the Kandahar administration, March 2005.
52. Interviews with Ghilzai notables, Kandahar, March 2005.
53. Interview with administration official, Kandahar, March 2005.
54. Interviews with administration officials, Kandahar, March 2005.
55. A. Wilder, A House Divided (Kabul: AREU, 2005), pp 23-24.
56. J. L. Anderson, The Lion's Grave (London: Atlantic Books, 2002), pp 151-172.
57. EurasiaNet, 17 January 2003, at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/ insight/articles/eav011503.shtml (accessed 12 July 2007).
58. Interviews with local officials, Kandahar, May 2005; Jeune Afrique l'intelligent, 15-21 June 2003.
59. Boston Globe, 17 October 2004
60. The Daily Telegraph, 25 September 2004
61. V. Felbab-Brown, 'Hasty poppy eradication in Afghanistan can sow more problems', Christian Science Monitor, 23 March 2006
62. B. R. Rubin, 'Despite security problems "large turnout" expected for parliamentary elections Sunday",Council on Foreign Relations, 16 September 2005, at http://www.cfr.org/publication/8871/ afghan_expert_rubin.html (accessed 12 July 2007).
63. UN sources, contacted in March 2005.
64. Information gathered by Noor Ullah during his tenure as UN official.
65. Interviews with government officials and local intellectuals, Kandahar, May 2005.
66. Christian Science Monitor, 6 October 2004.
67. Interviews with tribal notables, members of the administration and UN officials, March 2005.
68. Even among theAchakzais support forGulAghawas far fromunanimous beyond the militia strongmen.Thiswas for example the case of the Chief Justice in Kandahar, an Achakzai who often rejected requested from the governor and other strongmen. See H. Malikyar and B. R. Rubin, 'Center-periphery relations in the Afghan state: Current practices, future prospects'', Center on International Cooperation,New York University, 2002, p 26.
69. Also many Achakzais, who often travelled to Pakistan, were influenced by the parties of the nationalist left such as NationalAwami Party and supported the opposition toGulAgha inAfghanistan (seeWilder, op cit,Ref 37, p 24).
70. The Nation (Pakistan), 8 January 2002
71. interview with tribal leaders, Kandahar, January 2006.
72. In this case, however, the manoeuvre backfired and the Ghilzai Shura lost all credibility. It two leaders were candidates in the parliamentary elections of 2005, but only won a handful of votes (personal communication with political officer of embassy in Kabul, September 2006).
73. UN sources, contacted in March 2005.
74. Newsweek, 6 January 2003
75. interviews with local notables, administrators and UN officials in Kandahar, March 2005.
76. Interviews with government and UN officials, Kandahar, May 2005.
77. Interviews with custom officials and consultants, Kabul and Kandahar, February-March 2005.
78. Interview with tribal leader, Kandahar, January 2006
79. interview with UNAMA official, Kabul, October 2006.
80. Personal communication with UN official, Kabul, September 2006. The Barrech candidates, two brothers who led a tribal nationalist group, would have been elected if seven batches of votes from Shorabagh in the Barrech heartland had not been disqualified by the Electoral Complaints Commission (composed of nominees of the government and the international community) due to alleged tampering. The nature of the tampering was never confirmed of nor who supposedly committed the fraud. The only argument used during the deliberations was the accusation that the brothers would have received all the votes from the area, e.g. each ballot box contained only their votes. This was obviously not true as they had different vote counts and also had received counted votes from other districts in South-East Kandahar. In the view of UN officials, the determining influence over the decision for the ECC to disqualify the batches was the good contacts of the Karzais to key individuals in the international community.
81. Interviews with UN officials and diplomats, Kabul, September and November 2004.
82. Noor Ullah's own assessment, based on field work for the UN.
83. Wilder, op cit, Ref 37, pp 22, 24.
84. See Rubin, op cit, Ref 13, for a detailed description.
85. Other factors contributed to this process too, not least the growing importance of the trafficking of narcotics, although the impact of this in Kandahar was modest. Although some local politicians were accused of involvement in the traffic, they were able to do so mainly because of the connections in Kabul, as they did not have direct control over the poppy growing areas.