A double-edged sword: The role of neuroimaging in federal capital sentencing

American Journal of Law and Medicine

Volumn 33, Issue 2-3, 2007, Pages 501-522

  Barth, Abram S ^a  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FRONTAL LOBE; HUMAN; JURISPRUDENCE; MEDICAL EXPERT; MENTAL DISEASE; MENTAL HEALTH; NEUROIMAGING; NOTE; PUNISHMENT;

EID: 34548738184     PISSN: 00988588     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/009885880703300214     Document Type: Note

References (179)

1. See H. L. A. Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28, 28 (1968).
2. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 346 (1997).
3. The caution around the use of "punishment" arises from the Court's insistence on qualifying the commitment as "not punitive" and not implicating retribution or deterrence. Id. at 361-2. Although civil commitment is purported to be rehabilitative, its efficacy is questionable when it occurs in prison-like settings with an average of less than ten hours per week for treatment. See Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 2007, at A18-19.
4. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (1999) (defining a sexually violent predator as "any person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence.").
5. See Jennifer Kulynych, Comment, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1255-57 (1997) (explaining brain-imaging techniques).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)-(b) (2006).
7. See U.S. v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 290, 304 (2001) (collecting cases for the proposition).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(1) (2006).
9. J Grafman et al., Frontal Lobe Injuries, Violence, and Aggression: A Report of the Vietnam Head Injury Study, 46 NEUROL. 1231, 1231 (1996).
10. But see M.C. Brower & B.H. Price, Neuropsychiatry of Frontal Lobe Dysfunction in Violent and Criminal Behaviour: A Critical Review, 71 J. NEUROL. NEUROSURG. PSYCHIATRY 720, 720 (2001) (criticizing the VHIS for not accounting for other contributory factors).
11. Grafman, supra note 9, at 1238 ("[L]esions to the prefrontal cortex would impair the ability to access and sustain . . . [knowledge used to control behavior]. This impairment would bias the regulation and expression of behavior away from plans . . . making spontaneously appearing or reactive aggressive and violent behavior more likely.").
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)-(b) (2006). The federal statute also allows for the death penalty for drug offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (2006); espionage, 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2006) & 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(1) (2006); and treason, 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2006) & 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(1) (2006).
13. Amir Raz, Brain-imaging Data of ADHD, 21 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES 21:9 (Aug. 2004), available at http://www. psychiatrictimes.com/p040842.html.
14. Kulynych, supra note 5, at 1255.
15. Id. at 1256.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Jessie A. Seiden, The Criminal Brain: Frontal Lobe Dysfunction Evidence in Capital Proceedings, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 395, 402 (2004).
19. Center for Neuro Skills, Frontal Lobes, TBI RESOURCE GUIDE, http://www.neuroskills.com/index.shtml?main=/tbi/bfrontal.shtml (see illustration).
20. Adrian Raine et al., Brain Abnormalities in Murderers Indicated by Positron Emission Tomography, 42 BIOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 495, 495 (1997).
21. Center for Neuro Skills, Frontal Lobes, supra note 18.
22. Ned Potter, Similar Patters Seen in Murderers' Brains, ABC NEWS, http://preventdisease.com/news/articles/unique_patterns_murders_brains.shtml (last visited May 16, 2007).
23. Seiden, supra note 17, at 402.
24. Michael H. Thimble, Psychopathology of Frontal Lobe Syndromes, SEMINARS IN NEUROL. 10:3 (Sept. 1990), available at http://www.ect.org/effects/lobe.html.
25. Steven W. Anderson et al., Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early Damage in Human Prefrontal Cortex, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1032, 1032 (1999).
26. R. J. R. Blair & L. Cipolotti, Impaired Social Response Reversal: A Case of Acquired Sociopathy, 123 BRAIN 1122, 1122 (2000).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(1) (2006).
28. Brower, supra note 9, at 723.
29. Id. at 724 (citing Adrian Raine et al., Reduced Prefrontal and Increased Subcortical Brain Functioning Assessed Using Positron Emission Tomography in Predatory and Affective Murderers, 16 BEHAV. SCI. LAW 319, 332 (1998)).
30. Id.
31. Blair, supra note 25, at 1122.
32. Gasper v. Perry, No. 97-1542, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 14933, at *3 (4th Cir. July 2, 1998).
33. Laura Mansnerus, Damaged Brains and the Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, July 21, 2001, at B9 (referring to Dr. Dorothy Otnow Lewis).
34. See supra Part II.
35. Seiden, supra note 17, at 400; Ina M. Tarkka et al., Altered Frontal Lobe Function Suggested By Source Analysis of Event-Related Potentials In Impulsive Violent Alcoholics, 36 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 323, 328 (2001), available at http://alcalc. oxfordjournals.org/ cgi/content/full/36/4/323.
36. Brower, supra note 9, at 721.
37. Evidence of severe mental illness can result in a finding of no mens rea, not guilty by reason of insanity, or incompetence to stand trial. See Sherry F. Colb, Insane Fear: The Discriminatory Category of Mentally 111 and Dangerous, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 341, 350 (1999).
38. SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY CASES OF THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENDER SERVICES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY CASES: RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE COST AND QUALITY OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, pt. I, § B (May 1998), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/dpenalty/ 4REPORT.htm.
39. Id.
40. FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1994 § 60002, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598 (2006).
41. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3593(d)-(e) (2006).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (2006).
43. 18 U.S.C.A. §3592(c)(1)-(16) (2006). The statutory list is: (1) Death during commission of another crime; (2) Previous conviction of violent felony involving firearm; (3) Previous conviction of offense for which a sentence of death or life imprisonment was authorized; (4) Previous conviction of other serious offenses; (5) Grave risk of death to additional persons; (6) Heinous, cruel, or depraved manner of committing offense; (7) Procurement of offense by payment; (8) Pecuniary gain; (9) Substantial planning and premeditation; (10) Conviction for two felony drug offenses; (11) Vulnerability of victim; (12) Conviction for serious Federal drug offenses; (13) Continuing criminal enterprise involving drug sales to minors; (14) High public officials; (15) Prior conviction of sexual assault or child molestation; (16) Multiple killings or attempted killings.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (2006).
45. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3593(d), 3593(e) (2006).
46. United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 298-299 (4th Cir. 2003).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2006).
48. See United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F.Supp.2d 290, 303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (collecting cases for the proposition).
49. United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F.Supp.2d 464, 473 (E.D.Pa. 2001).
50. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
51. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983) (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976)), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2) (2006).
52. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274-276.
53. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 897 (quoting Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274-76).
54. United States v. Sampson, 335 F.Supp.2d 166 (D. Mass. 2004).
55. Id. at 218.
56. Id. at 219 (quoting Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 463 (5th Cir. 2000)).
57. Id.
58. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
59. Id. at 592.
60. United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 815 (4th Cir. 2000).
61. Id.
62. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-594.
63. Id.
64. Flores, 210 F.3d at 464.
65. Id. at 463.
66. BRUCE A. ARRIGO, INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 133 (2002).
67. See Brower, supra note 9, at 721.
68. Seiden, supra note 17, at 418.
69. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169 (1994).
70. United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F.Supp.2d 464, 487 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
71. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 324 (1989).
72. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
73. Id. at 586.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(1) (2006).
75. United States v. Pineyro, 372 F. Supp.2d 133, 139 (D. Mass 2005).
76. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §5K2.13 (2004).
77. Id. at cmt. n.1.
78. Pineyro, 372 F. Supp.2d at 139.
79. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3593(c)-(d) (2006).
80. Id.
81. John H. Montgomery et. al., Expert Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Juror Responses, 33 J. OF AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 509, 517 (2005).
82. See Wilson v. Schomig, 234 F. Supp. 2d 851, 860 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that "[d]efendant has not demonstrated that, even if he suffers from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, he was under the influence of this disturbance when he committed the murders").
83. Bruce Bower, Teen Brains on Trial: The Science of Neural Development Tangles with the Juvenile Death Penalty, 165 SCIENCE NEWS ONLINE 19:299 (May 2004), available at http://www.sciencenews. org/articles/20040508/bob9-asp (setting the "biological age of maturity" between 21 and 26).
84. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323-4 (1989).
85. Id. at 307.
86. Id. at 309.
87. Id. at 310.
88. Id. at 323.
89. Id. at 324.
90. Hood v. Cockrell, 72 Fed. Appx 171, 179 n.8 (5th Cir. 2003).
91. See Smith v. Dretke, 422 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 2005); Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1243 (10th Cir. 2003); Housel v. Head, 238 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001).
92. See Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1218-22 (11th Cir. 2001).
93. See e.g., Martinez v. Dretke, 404 F.3d 878, 889 (5th Cir. 2005); Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698, 703 (5th Cir.1999).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
95. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
96. Id. at 694.
97. Truesdale v. Moore, 142 F.3d 749, 754 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Bunch v. Thompson, 949 F.2d 1354, 1364 (4th Cir.1991)).
98. See United States v. Zimmerman, 155 Fed. Appx. 821, 826 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that as "a general matter, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be brought pursuant to a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255") (citing United States v. Daniel, 956 F.2d 540, 543 (6th Cir.1992); Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-505 (2003)).
99. Truesdale v. Moore, 142 F.3d 749, 754-755 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that when mental health evidence is a double-edged sword, the "best course for a federal habeas court is to credit plausible strategic judgments").
100. See, e.g., Foster v. Johnson, 293 F.3d 766, 778-79 (5th Cir.2002) ("[A] tactical decision not to pursue and present potential mitigating evidence on the grounds that it is double-edged in nature is objectively reasonable"); Lamb v. Johnson, 179 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Informed strategic decisions of counsel are given a heavy measure of deference and will not be second guessed."); Crane v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that trial counsel who decided that potentially mitigating evidence was more harmful than helpful could reasonably choose not to introduce same); Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551, 564 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that tactical decisions not to pursue and present potentially mitigating evidence on the grounds that it is double-edged in nature is objectively reasonable); Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1122 (5th Cir. 1997) ("A conscious and informed decision on trial tactics and strategy cannot be the basis for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel unless it is so ill chosen that it permeates the entire trial with obvious unfairness."); Boyle v. Johnson, 93 F.3d 180, 187-88 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that an attorney's decision not to pursue a mental health defense or to present mitigating evidence concerning the defendant's possible mental illness was reasonable where counsel was concerned that such testimony would not be viewed as mitigating by the jury); Mann v. Scott, 41 F.3d 968, 984 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that a tactical decision not to introduce double-edged sword mitigating evidence is entitled to great deference).
101. Pursell v. Horn, 187 F. Supp. 2d 260, 383 (W.D. Penn. 2002) (quoting Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1367 (11th Cir.1995)).
102. Id. at 382 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000)).
103. SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY CASES (1998), http://www.uscourts.gov/dpenalty/1COVER.htm (follow "Table of Contents" hyperlink; then follow "Factors Affecting the Availability, Cost and Quality of Counsel" hyperlink).
104. 998 F.2d 269, 278 (5th Cir.1993).
105. Id. at 278; see also Zimmerman v. Cockrell, 2002 WL 32833097, at *7 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that defendant with frontal lobe injury and resultant violent tendencies did not demonstrate that had the neurological evidence been presented to the jury, there would have been a "reasonable probability of a different outcome").
106. Seiden, supra note 17, at 402-403.
107. Id. at 403.
108. Grant v. Dretke, 151 Fed. Appx. 344, 345 (5th Cir. 2005) (involving a defendant who suffered from frontal lobe dysfunction that was not manifested to counsel) (quoting Miniel v. Cockrell, 339 F.3d 331, 345 (5th Cir. 2003)).
109. Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1254 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995)).
110. See id. at 1256 ("A finding of deficient performance does not end our inquiry, however. We must also find that Caro was prejudiced by his attorney's incompetence.").
111. Id. at 1257 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 397-398).
112. Id. at 1258 (citing Williams, 529 U.S at 398).
113. See e.g., Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 176 (2004) (noting that "prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel necessitat[es] a new trial").
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(E)(1) (2006).
115. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US 68, 83 (1985) ("[W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.").
116. James v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 543, 552 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999); Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502, 1513 (10th Cir. 1995)).
117. Castro, 71 F.3d at 1516 (quoting Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519, 1530 (10th Cir. 1995)).
118. See Walker v. Oklahoma, 167 F.3d 1339, 1348 (10th Cir. 1999).
119. James, 211 F.3d at 552 (citing Castro, 71 F.3d at 1513; Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 336 (10th Cir.1991)).
120. Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1109 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Liles, 945 F.2d at 336).
121. Id. (quoting Liles, 945 F.2d at 336).
122. United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1252 n.4 (10th Cir. 1998).
123. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH 22 (Alan Sheridan trans., Penguin Books 1991) (1977).
124. Nicholas Thompson, My Brain Made Me Do It: Breakthroughs in Neuroscience Are Changing Our Understanding of Criminal Culpability. That Worries a Leading Neuroscientist - But it Shouldn't Worry Lawyers or Judges, LEGAL AFF., JAN-FEB 2006, at 50, 53 (2006).
125. Id.
126. Brower, supra note 9, at 720 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 725.
128. ARRIGO, supra note 65, at 135.
129. Id.
130. JOHN MONAHAN, NAT'L INST, OF MENTAL HEALTH, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 17 (1981).
131. Id. at 18.
132. Id. at 19.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2002).
134. Id.
135. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 926 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
136. United States v. Sampson, 335 F.Supp.2d 166, 220 (D. Mass. 2004) (quoting Eugenia T. La Fontaine, Note, A Dangerous Preoccupation with Future Danger, 44 B.C. L. REV. 207, 228 (2002)).
137. Id. (quoting Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 2000).
138. Id.
139. Montgomery, supra note 80, at 516.
140. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
141. Montgomery, supra note 80, at 516.
142. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
143. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1986) (finding civil commitment proceedings under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act "essentially civil in nature" because "the State has disavowed any interest in punishment, provided for the treatment of those it commits, and established a system under which committed persons may be released after the briefest time in confinement").
145. Compare id. at 364 (noting the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act required that future "sexual dangerousness be proved beyond a reasonable doubt" prior to civil commitment), with Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1981) ("In Texas, capital cases require bifurcated proceedings-a guilt phase and a penalty phase. If the defendant is found guilty, a separate proceeding before the same jury is held to fix the punishment. At the penalty phase . . . the jury must assess the defendant's future dangerousness.").
146. Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness Some Observations on the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225, 229 (1960) ("Whether commitments to a mental institution be via a 'civil' or 'criminal' route their functions are substantially the same: that 'mentally ill' persons who evidence dangerousness to themselves or others be provided by the state with custody and care even if there is no known effective therapy or therapy is unavailable. Commitment procedures, however labeled, constitute a sanction, so far as the person confined is concerned, in the form of deprivation of liberty, at least to the extent that commitment is without regard to his 'wishes.'").
147. THOMAS SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY, 142 (Collier Books 1963) (quoting David L. Bazelon: "The individual is confined in the hospital for the purpose of treatment, not punishment.").
148. Bin Laden, supra note 47.
149. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) ("A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment. We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a "mental illness" or "mental abnormality."); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 314-15 (1993) (sustaining Kentucky statute that permits commitment of "mentally retarded" or "mentally ill" and dangerous individual); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 366 (1986) (sustaining Illinois statute that permits commitment of "mentally ill" and sexually dangerous individual); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey Cry., 309 U.S. 270, 271-72, (1940) (sustaining Minnesota statute that permits commitment of dangerous individual with "psychopathic personality").
150. Id.
151. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding the execution of juveniles to be cruel and unusual in violation of the Eigth Amendment).
152. Brief of American Medical Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 14-16, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), available at http://www.abanet.org/ crimjust/juvjus/simmons/ama.pdf.
153. Id. at 16 (stating that this finding was the result of brain-imaging studies).
154. Id. at 11.
155. Id. at 16 (quoting Tomas Paus et al., Structural Maturation of Neural Pathways, Children and Adolescents: In Vivo Study, 283 SCI. 1908 (1999)).
156. Id. at 20.
157. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). Other possible theories of punishment include moral education, psychological rehabilitation, and restorative justice. See generally Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUBLIC AFF. 208 (1984).
158. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
159. Id. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).
160. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 138-39 (John Ladd trans., Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 2nd. ed. 1999) (1797).
161. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 102 (Aspen Publishers 6th ed. 2001) (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (citation omitted)).
162. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 304 (1989).
163. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 571 (2005).
164. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185 (1976).
165. Irving Piliavin et. al., Crime, Deterrence, and Rational Choice, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 101, 115 (1986).
166. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185.
167. Id. at 186.
168. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988)).
169. NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 172 (1982).
170. Supra note 34.
171. Ernest S. Barratt, Impulsiveness and Aggression, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER 61, 75 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994).
172. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(1) (2006)
173. Id.
174. 438 U.S. 586 (1978)
175. Id. at 604 (emphasis in original).
176. Crook v. State, 813 So.2d 68,75 (Fla. 2002).
177. Id. at 75-76.
178. 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (a)(1) (2006).
179. Crook, 813 So.2d at 75.