Harassment Versus Lobbying for Trade Protection

International Trade Journal

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 1995, Pages 203-224

  Westhoff, Frank H ^a   Yarbrough, Beth V ^a   Yarbrough, Robert M ^a  

^a AMHERST COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548701269     PISSN: 08853908     EISSN: 15210545     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/08853909508523826     Document Type: Article

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