A principal-agent model of public research with a retrospective payoff rule

Science and Public Policy

Volumn 34, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 317-328

  Fernández Carro, Remo ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MODELING; RESEARCH INSTITUTION;

EID: 34548673065     PISSN: 03023427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3152/030234207X227152     Document Type: Article

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