Crisis in Turkey: The conflict of political languages

Middle East Policy

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 118-135

  Yavuz, M Hakan ^a   Özcan, Nihat Ali ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF UTAH   (United States)

^b Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV)   (Turkey)

^c TOBB UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548432128     PISSN: 10611924     EISSN: 14754967     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4967.2007.00317.x     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. The authors interviewed a total of 12 high ranking security and civilian bureaucrats for this study. The interviews were conducted in a face-to-face format in Ankara. All interviewees agreed to be quoted, subject to anonymity. Dr. Yavuz would like to thank the University of Utah Middle East Center for providing travel support to carry out field work in Turkey to write this article. We would also like to thank Kenan Camurcu, Mujeeb R. Khan, Saban Kardas and Hasan Kosebalaban.
2. See M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford University Press, 2003).
3. For more on the French and American version of secularism, see Ahmet Kuru, "Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey: The Case of the Justice and Development Party," in M. Hakan Yavuz, ed., The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and AK Parti (University of Utah Press, 2006), pp. 136-159.
4. Engin Yidirim, "Labor Pains or Achilles' Heel: The Justice and Development Party and Labor in Turkey," in Yavuz, op. cit.
5. Jose Casanova, "The Long. Difficult, and Tortuous Journey of Turkey into Europe and the Dilemma of European Civilization," Constellations, Vol. 13, No 2 (2006), pp. 234-247. Joseph Nye argues, "One of the crucial questions of twenty-first century politics will be how the world copes with the rise of political Islam. For radical Islamists (and some Westerners), the rise of Islam sets the scene for a 'clash of civilizations,' which they welcome as a polarizing device that will allow them to recruit from the much larger Muslim mainstream. "But Turkey has the potential to show the shallowness of such a scenario by demonstrating the compatibility of liberal democracy and Islam. Unfortunately, this appears to have been lost on the neoconservatives in the Bush administration, for whom the invasion of Iraq and its liberation from Saddam Hussein was supposed to provide a beacon for a wave of democratization that would transform the Middle East. What they produced instead was an 'electocracy' that, in the absence of liberal institutions, replaced the tyranny of the Sunni minority with a tyranny of the Shiite majority and a religious sectarian civil war." http://www.project- syndicate.org/commentary/nye45.
6. Graham Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World (The U.S. Institute of Peace, forthcoming).
7. At the Copenhagen Council summit in 1993, the criteria for future membership in the EU were determined: (1) the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minority rights; (2) the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive market forces within the EU; and (3) the ability to shoulder the obligations of membership, such as adherence to the goals of political, economic and monetary union.
8. Soli Özel, "Testing Democracy," World Today (June 2007), p. 12.
9. The statement created a major political debate and polarized society between the military and the AKP sympathizers. Hasan Celal Güzel, a former center-right politician, wrote the most critical essays in his column in the daily Radikal.
10. Ahmet Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik/Turkiye'nin Uluslarasi Konumu (Istanbul: Küre Yayinlari, 2000). Yalçin Akdogan, Siyasal Islam, Refah Partisi 'nin Anatomisi, (Istanbul: Sehir Yayincilik, 2000). Ömer Dinçer, Ömer Çelik and Yalçin Akdogan were the members of the editorial board of the Islamist magazine Bilgi ve Hikmet. This semi-academic journal included a number of articles about the role of Islam and criticized the hegemonic secular system in Turkey. One of the most controversial articles was written by Professor Ömer Dinçer, "21. Yüzyila Girerken Dünya ve Türkiye Gündeminde Islam," Bilgi ve Hikmet, No. 12, (1995), pp. 3-7. This article criticizes the Kemalist reforms and calls for the restoration of an Islamic worldview. With the AKP government, Professor Dinçer was made the undersecretary of the Prime Ministry. Due to his controversial writing against the reforms of Mustafa Kemal, he became the main target of the militant secular newspaper Cumhuriyet. Professor Dinçer was also accused of plagiarism, and after close scrutiny by the Council of Higher Education, he was found "guilty and banned from teaching in universities." "YÖK Intihal Dedi," Milliyet, 21 October 2005; (Retrieved from http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/346177.asp). Prime Minister Erdogan's adviser Ömer Çelik also made several contributions to Bilgi ve Hikmet.
11. See Ömer Çelik, "Siyasal Özgürlük, Siyasal Bilginin Epistemolojisi ve Radikal Islam," Bilgi ve Hikmet, (1995), pp. 8-13.
12. Mehmet Bekaroglu, a prominent Muslim democrat, wrote the best study on the evolution of the AKP and its leadership: see M. Bekaroglu, "Adil Düzen"den "Dünya Gerceklerine": Siyasetin Sonu (Ankara: Elips, 2007). This lengthy yet detailed work provides deep sociological and psychological insights about the roots of the AKP.
13. Sencer Ayata, "Meydanlardakiler yeni orta sinif tir," Milliyet, 21-22 May 2007; Yavuz's e-mail exchange with Professor Ayata on May 22, 2007.
14. Gündüz Aktan, "Korkmazcanlar," Radikal, 24 April 2007;
15. Aktan, "Çiplak Gercekler" Radikal, 1 May 2007.
16. As of 2007, nationalist feelings are running high. Many people are disappointed with the lack of U.S. support against the PKK, and many resent U.S. support for Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq. The cooperation of the Kurdish militias in Iraq is more important to the United States than Turkey's concerns.
17. Erdogan excluded a significant number of AKP deputies from the "National Outlook Movement of Erbakan "in an effort to alter perceptions that the party was too conservative and to position it in the center of the political spectrum. Moreover, Erdogan did not renominate most of the deputies who voted against the March 1 motion that would have allowed U.S. troops to enter Iraq from Turkey in 2003. Many ex-Parliamentarians such as AKP Adana MP Abdullah Çaliskan claim their vote was due to the April 27 memorandum of the military and the meeting between Erdogan and Büyükanit on May 5, 2007, at Dolmabahce Palace. Former MP Ersönmez Yarbay of Ankara, who has always been in favor of democratic processes within the AKP, explains the major transformation of the list as a reflection of a region-based solidarity network. Milliyet, 7 June 2007.
18. Yalçinbayir said "The AKP won the 2002 election with a platform that stressed three 'Ys': Yoksulluk (Poverty), Yasaklar (Restrictions), and Yolsuzluk (Corruption). Now we need to add four more "Ys" to describe the party: 'Yozlasma, Yandaslik (clienetalism), Yagcilik, Yiyicilik (bribery), Yobazlik (religious fanaticism).' Radikal, 8 June 2007. According to Kenan Camurcu, a leading analyst of Islamic politics, "Erdogan cannot allow some 'native' politicians to criticize his policies, and he preferred to bring 'guests' such as Ertugrul Günay into the party to give impression that the party is inclusive. But he does not want to lose his authoritarian control." Interview with Camurcu, 8 June 2007.
19. In the education of young military officers, the two events are constantly reinforced. When the group of ideologically oriented military officers took over the control of the government between 1908 and 1918, they destroyed the empire and ended the Ottoman state and also risked the viability of the Turks as a group. When Büyükanit was commander of the War College (Kara Harp Okulu) in Ankara, he organized a conference to examine "The Lessons of the Balkan Wars and Their Contemporary Impacts," on 26 April 1995. The proceedings of this panel were published by the War College. For more on the impacts of the Balkan Wars on the Turkish military, see Selek Sabahattin, Anadolu Ihtilali, (Istanbul: Kastas Yayinlari, 1987), pp. 105-117.
20. For the impacts of the military coups on military dicispline, see Akyaz Dogan, Askeri Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi, Hiyerarsi Disi Örgütlenmeden Emir Komuta Zincirine, (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2002).
21. M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, "The Kurdish Question and the JDP," The Middle East Journal, Vol 13, No. 1 (2006), pp. 102-119;
22. M. Hakan Yavuz "Kurdish Ethno-Nationalism," in Nationalism and Minority Identities in Islamic Societies, ed. Maya Shatzmiller (McGill: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), pp. 56-85;
23. M.Hakan Yavuz and Michael M. Gunter, "The Kurdish Nation," Current History, (January 2001), pp. 33-39.
24. The military handbook for conscripts defines Western civilization as the collective legacy of humanity that stresses reason, technology and freedom. Yuri Sevgisi Egitimi (Ankara: K.K.K. Basimevi, 2003), p. 37. Radikal, 25 Nisan 2002, "Asker AB tartismasini bitirdi."
25. Hasan Kösebalaban, "Turkey's EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures," Middle East Policy, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2002), pp. 130-46; .
26. M. Hakan Yavuz and Mujeeb Khan, "Turkey and Europe: Will East Meet West?," Current History, Vol. 103, No. 676 (November 2004), pp. 389-393.
27. Ersel Aydinli, Nihat Ali Özcan, Dogan Akyaz, "The Turkish Military's March Toward Europe," Foreign Affairs (January/February 2006), pp. 77-90. For a different interpretation of the military and the EU, see Kösebalaban, "Turkey's EU membership."
28. See Saban Kardas, "Turkey and the Iraqi Crisis: JDP Between Identity and Interest," in The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and AK Parti (University of Utah Press, 2006), pp. 306-333.
29. Fikret Bila, Sivil Darbe Girigimi ve Ankara'da Irak Savaslari (Ankara: Ümit Yayincilik, 2003), pp. 42, 43.
30. For the dissent against the soft policies of Özkök, see Mustafa Balbay, "Genç Subaylar tedirgin," Cumhuriyet, 23 Mayis 2003. Özkök defended its policies by organizing a press conference;
31. see "TSKda görüs ayriligi yok," Radikal, 14 Nisan 2004.
32. One of the key reasons many Islamist deputies, along with pro-Barzani deputies of the AKP, voted against the March 1 motion has to do with the possibility of the increased role of the military and the declaration of the emergency law around the Turkish-Iraqi border. For instance, Ahmet Davutoglu told CNN-Turk TV, "If we were to allow the U.S. troops, we had to declare an emergency situation in southeast Turkey. This could have created a problem in our relations with the EU" (16 February 2004).
33. "Terörle Mücadele Yasasi," Zaman, 8 September 2005;
34. Ekrem Dumanli, "Terörle Mücadelede rota sasarsa," Zaman, 12 September 2005.
35. Hasan Cemal, "Basbakan Erdogan'dan Amerika yolunda Komutanlara Mesajlar: Irtica diye Bir Tehdit Yok," Milliyet, 1 October 2006.
36. For the statements of Ilker Basbug, see http://www.kkk.tsk.mil.tr/ BasinHalklaIliskiler/BasinAciklama/DiyarbakirBasinAciklama.doc.
37. Ilhan Uzgel, "Dis Politikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele," Mulkiye, No. 252 (2006), pp. 69-84.
38. Foreign Minister Gül argued that the PKK received not only military support from Iraqi groups under U.S. occupation but also training and new military tactics from the Iraqi resistance and some Kurdish permergas. Hürriyet, 14 June 2007.
39. Rusen Cakir, http://ntvmsnbc.com/news/275733.asp;
40. Ahmet Insel, "Neofeodal devlette ilerlerken," Radikal II, 4 March 2007. For more on the military vs. Turkish police force, see http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/ 2006/harpakademilerikonusmasi_02102006.html
41. Cemil Cicek, the minister of justice, became the main target of the Guien community because of his support for the anti-terror law. For more on the reaction of the military, see Cumhuriyet, 9 April 2007;
42. Ahmet Hakan, "Cemaat, ey cemaat," Hürriyet, 2 April 2007;
43. Ahmet Hakan, "Cemaat diyor ki: O bakan bize düsman," Hürriyet, 4 April 2007.
44. These accusations spread around the websites. See critical responses to these rumors: Mehmet Yilmaz, Hürriyet, 6 March 2006;
45. Bekir Coskun, Hürriyet, 7 March 2006.
46. According to Ferhat Sarikaya, a prosecutor in Van who stayed in Guien community dormitories when he was a law student and is believed to have continued his ties with the Gülen community, was accused by senior military officers, including Büyükanit, of using the "Kurdish issue" to undermine Turkey's bid to join the European Union.
47. Mehmet Yilmaz, Hürriyet, 7 March 2007.
48. Sermin Saribas, "Türkiye'nin en Ünlü Komplo Teorisyenleri," Hürriyet, 6 May 2001;
49. Koru is one of "Turkey's three leading conspiracy theorists." For more on Koru's conspiracy theories, see Birikim, No. 178 (February 2004).
50. His wildest conspiracy theories involve the CIA's attack on September 11, 2001. Yeni Safak, 17 Eylül 2001. As he starts to have access to the "goodies of the government during the AKP," he has changed a bit. He has two columns in the daily pro-AKP Yeni Safak.
51. On the mobilization of the Gülen networks in Kurdish provinces, see Altan Tan's interview in Milliyet, July 30, 2007.