Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 383-404

  Roberts, Kevin ^a  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548272179     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0211-2     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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14. Penn EM (2006) A model of farsighted voting. Harvard University (unpublished)