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Volumn 44, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 157-166

Perverse incentives in the medicare prescription drug benefit

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS; DECISION MAKING; DRUG COST; DRUG FORMULARY; DRUG INDUSTRY; HEALTH CARE PLANNING; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; MEDICARE; PRESCRIPTION; PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT; PROSPECTIVE PRICING; RISK ASSESSMENT;

EID: 34548251869     PISSN: 00469580     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5034/inquiryjrnl_44.2.157     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (9)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.