Originalism and emergencies: A reply to Lawson

Boston University Law Review

Volumn 87, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 313-321

  Posner, Eric A ^a   Vermeule, Adrian ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548237636     PISSN: 00068047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Note

References (44)

1. Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary Times: Common Sense in Times of Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REV. 289, 293 (2007).
2. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007).
3. See id. at 56 ("Our original constitutional structure, with a relatively weak presidency, reflects the concerns of the eighteenth century and is not well adapted to current conditions.").
4. Lawson, supra note 1, at 308.
5. Id.
6. Id at 312.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 311.
9. See id. at 299 n.55.
10. Id. at 296.
11. See id. at 293.
12. Id. at 312.
13. Id. at 311 ("There is no general constitutional requirement of legal deference to executive or legislative actors; the deference that I have just described is prima facie epistemological.").
14. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 55.
15. We put aside the possibility that judicial delay might be desirable to offset executive hastiness or overreaction to the emergency - a possibility that neither Lawson nor we think supports a robust role for courts. See id. at 59-86;
16. Lawson, supra note 1, at 297.
17. See Lawson, supra note 1, at 305-06.
18. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 6.
19. 343 U.S. 579(1952).
20. See id. at 588-89.
21. Id. at 585.
22. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
23. See id. at 2791.
24. Lawson, supra note 1, at 312.
25. Id. at 310.
26. See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1407-09 (1989).
27. Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1823 (1997).
28. Id. For the view that interpretation is necessarily consequentialist, at least in part, see Cass R. Sunstein, Of Snakes and Butterflies: A Reply, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2234, 2238 (2006).
29. See Lawson, supra note 26, at 1824 ("[A]djudication should take strong account of principles like political legitimacy and consistency with current practice.").
30. Cass Sunstein & Randy Barnett, Constitution in Exile?, LEGAL AFF., May 3, 2005, http://legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/ debateclub_cie0505.msp. Thanks to Cass Sunstein for pointing us to this quotation.
31. See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 2236 & n.8.
32. See Lawson, supra note 1, at 312.
33. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554-79 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
34. id. at 579-99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
35. Justice Stevens joined Justice Scalia's originalist dissent in Hamdi.
36. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989) ("[M]ost originalists are faint-hearted.").
37. See Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?; Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273, 292.
38. For a qualified defense of Burkean constitutional adjudication, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006).
39. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 (2006);
40. id. at 2831-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
41. See Sunstein, supra note 35, at 367-68.
42. This is the thrust of Barnett's argument. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
43. See Lawson, supra note 1, at 309, 312.
44. We emphasize that we are not sure whether Lawson wants judges to actually consult originalist materials during emergencies. If he does not, the issue is still an important one fairly raised by his contribution, so we take the opportunity to address it.