A damage-revelation rationale for coupon remedies

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 653-661

  Polinsky, A Mitchell ^a   Rubinfeld, Daniel L ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548235065     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewm016     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Borenstein, Severin. 1996. "Settling for Coupons: Discount Contracts as Compensation and Punishment in Antitrust Lawsuits," 39 Journal of Law and Economics 379-404.
2. Gramlich, Fred. 1986. "Scrip Damages in Antitrust Cases," 31 The Antitrust Bulletin 261-85.
3. Harvard Law Review. 1996. "In-Kind Class Action Settlements," 109 Harvard Law Review 810-27.
4. Kaplow, Louis, and Steven Shavell. 1996. "Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages," 39 Journal of Law and Economics 191-210.
5. Leslie, Christopher R. 2002. "A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation," 49 UCLA Law Review 991-1098.
6. Miller, Geoffrey P., and Lori S. Singer. 1997. "Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements," 60 Law and Contemporary Problems 97-154.
7. Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 2006. "The Deadweight Loss of Coupon Remedies for Price Overcharges," Working Paper No. 271 (revised), John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School.
8. Spier, Kathryn E. 1994. "Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards," 10 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 84-95.