Filiality versus sociality and individuality: On Confucianism as "consanguinitism"

Philosophy East and West

Volumn 53, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 234-250

  Liu, Qingping ^a  

^a BEIJING NORMAL UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548221927     PISSN: 00318221     EISSN: 15291898     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/pew.2003.0015     Document Type: Review

References (35)

1. See, for example, Charles A. Moore, ed., The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii [University of Hawai'i Press], 1967)
2. Li Li Zhehou, "A Reevaluation of Confucianism," in Wm. Theodore de Bary and Richard Lufrano, comps., Sources of Chinese Tradition, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), vol. 2, pp. 574-579
3. Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), pp. 171 - 181
4. Most of the quotations from the Analects are my own translations, based on the text in Zhu Xi, Sishu zhangju jizhu (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1983), pp. 47-195
5. with reference to D. C. Lau, trans., Confucius: The Analects (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979)
6. to James Legge, trans., Confucian Analects, in The Chinese Classics, vol. 1 (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 1960)
7. and to Wing-tsit Chan, trans., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 18-48
8. Most of the quotations from the Mencius are my own translations, based on the text in Zhu Xi, Sishu zhangju jizhu, pp. 201-377
9. with reference to D. C. Lau, trans., Mencius (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970)
10. to James Legge, trans., The Works of Mencius, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895)
11. and to Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, pp. 51-83
12. Hsieh Yu-wei, "Filial Piety and Chinese Society," in Moore, The Chinese Mind, p. 173
13. Lau, Confucius: The Analects, "Introduction," pp. 14, 18
14. Tu Wei-ming, Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Confucian Religiousness (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 51-52
15. Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 99
16. Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1963), p. 130
17. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, pp. 102-103
18. Although he does not offer a detailed argument, Max Weber already mentions this point when he talks about Confucian ethics: "The absolutely primary virtue, constantly inculcated in children, was filial piety toward parents. In case of conflict, piety preceded all other virtues." See Max Weber, The Religion of China, trans. Hans H. Gerth (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 157
19. Tu Wei-ming, "Confucius and Confucianism," in Walter H. Slote and George A. De Vos, eds., Confucianism and the Family (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 13
20. See Kwong-loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 55-56
21. Hsieh, "Filial Piety and Chinese Society," p. 185
22. Strictly speaking, "do what is proper in your heart" is a rule that is not unique to Confucianism; other schools of Chinese philosophy such as Daoism and Moism also stress the importance of "the heart at ease" (xin an) to the daily lives and activities of human beings, from different perspectives. The key to understanding the difference here is that Confucianism regards neither "taking no purposive action" nor "universal love," but kinship bonds alone, as most capable of making one feel at ease in one's inner heart. See Qingping Liu, "'Renwei' yu 'qingli': Zhongguo zhexue chuantong de jiben tezheng chutan" ("Human action" and "affectional principle": On the fundamental features of traditional Chinese philosophy), Zhongguo zhexue shi (History of Chinese philosophy) 3 (1997): 6-7
23. Qingping Liu, "Life: The True, the Good and the Beautiful: A Comparative Study of Greek and Pre-Qin Philosophies," Analecta Husserliana 67 (2000): 323-338
24. Wing-tsit Chan, "Chinese Theory and Practice, with Special Reference to Humanism," in Moore, The Chinese Mind, pp. 27-28
25. To be sure, Confucianism does not impose any transcendent principles or the Kantian "Categorical Imperative" from without for people to observe, and thus it may be regarded more as a person-making ethic than a rule-oriented ethic in this sense. David Hall and Roger Ames convincingly demonstrate this distinc-tion through their profound and inspiring comparison of the "immanent" mode of thought and the notion of the "aesthetic" order presented by Confucius and the " transcendent" mode of thought and the notion of the "rational" order presented by classical Western philosophy. See David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), especially pp. 12-16 and 131-138. I thank Judith Berling and Peimin Ni for bringing this point to my attention. In my opinion, nevertheless, this does not mean that there is no general rule or eternal principle in Confu cianism at all. The point is that Confucian rules, including the one of "the heart at ease" and the one that takes consanguineous affection as the highest value of human life, are not "rational" rules grounded on some external authority or transcendent principles, like those in classical Western philosophy, but essentially "affectional" rules directly rooted in the Heaven-bestowed heart-nature of human beings, which, according to the person-making ethic of Confucianism, are able not only to make one feel at ease but also to assist in the cultivation of one's personality if one observes them in daily life. It is in this sense that the fundamental spirit of Confucianism should be thought of as based on affectionate feeling rather than rationality
26. See Qingping Liu, "Rujia Iunli: Daode lixing haishi xieqin qingli?" (Confucian ethics: Moral reason or consanguineous-affection?), Zhongguo zhexue shi 3 (1999): 36-42
27. Qingping Liu, "Xieqin qingli yu daode lixing de xianming fancha: Kongzi yu Sugeladi lunli guanzhi bijiao" (The contrast between consanguineous affection and moral reason: A comparative study of Confucius' and Socrates' ethics), Kongzi yanjiu (Confucius studies) 1 (2001): 39-45
28. Tu, Confucian Thought, p. 176
29. Francis L. K. Hsu, "Confucianism in Comparative Context," in Slote and De Vos, Confucianism and the Family p. 61
30. See de Bary and Lufrano, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 2 : 138-141
31. See Chen Duxiu, "The Way of Confucius and Modern Life," in de Bary and Lufrano, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 2 : 353-356
32. Liang Shuming, "Reconstructing the Community," in de Bary and Lufrano, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 2 : 382-383
33. See Liang Qichao, "Renewing the people," in de Bary and Lufrano, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 2 : 291-292
34. As Francis L. K. Hsu points out, "the ethic of filial piety ... gave the Chinese a high degree of kinship solidarity but prevented them from strong and enduring alliances outside of it" (Hsu, "Confucianism in Comparative Context," p. 63.)
35. Tu, Centrality and Commonality, pp. 41-42