Paradossi della democrazia deliberativa

Stato e Mercato

Volumn , Issue 73, 2005, Pages 3-31

  Regonini, Gloria ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 34548085229     PISSN: 03929701     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1425/19632     Document Type: Review

References (72)

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