Correspondence: Uncertainty and reassurance in international politics [3]

International Security

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 193-197

  Tang, Shiping ^a,c   Montgomery, Evan Braden ^b  

^a NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^c NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548072216     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2007.32.1.193     Document Type: Letter

References (17)

1. Evan Braden Montgomery, "Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty," International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), pp. 151-185.
2. Additional references to the article appear in parentheses in the text. Other works on this subject include David M. Edelstein, "Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers," Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Fall 2002), pp. 1-40;
3. Andrew Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation," International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 325-357;
4. Andrew Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005);
5. and Seth Weinberger, "Institutional Signaling and the Origins of the Cold War," Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Summer 2003), pp. 80-115.
6. Montgomery commits an additional error that cannot be addressed here: he relies heavily on offense-defense theory without acknowledging criticisms of it.
7. Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 67-70.
8. Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, p. 19.
9. A malign state is generally uninterested in knowing other states' intentions. It merely wants to know their capabilities and resolve in being able to resist potentially aggressive acts.
10. This situation poses a dilemma: should a state pursue further reassurance with costlier signals or should it stop reassurance to avoid being exploited by a malign state? I explore how states cope with this dilemma elsewhere.
11. For a formal exposition of this tactic's logic, see Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, chaps. 2-3.
12. Weinberger, "Institutional Signaling and the Origins of the Cold War," pp. 96-107;
13. and Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, pp. 96-98.
14. Randall L. Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 14-15.
15. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," pp. 58-60.
16. Obviously, these two sets of conditions interact with each other.
17. Montgomery comes close to recognizing this possibility when he notes, "There is ... little room in offensive realism for a strategy of reassurance. Montgomery, "Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma," p. 155.