Prenatal testing for selection against disabilities

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 457-462

  Mahowald, Mary B ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DISABLED PERSON; ETHICS; FEMALE; GENETIC DISORDER; HUMAN; MORALITY; PREGNANCY; PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS; REVIEW; SOCIAL JUSTICE; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY;

DISABLED PERSONS; FEMALE; GENETIC DISEASES, INBORN; HUMANS; MORAL OBLIGATIONS; PREGNANCY; PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS; SOCIAL JUSTICE; STEREOTYPING;

EID: 34547963013     PISSN: 09631801     EISSN: 14692147     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0963180107070594     Document Type: Review

References (7)

1. I use the term "disability" rather than "impairment" in this essay because the former term is most prevalently used in this context. In fact, however, the term "impairment" would be more appropriate because it refers to conditions that are obviously not as yet socially disabling.
2. Cf. Parens E, Asch A, editors. Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press; 2000:13-7.
3. The subject of the conclusion could be stated either in its particular or universal form, but the latter is obviously more significant.
4. Asch in note 2, Parens, Asch 2000:13.
5. Because some newborns are less developmentally advanced than some fetuses, and some are more advanced, women who have given birth to children prematurely, as I have (twice), as well as postmaturely (once), are particularly observant of this connection.
6. Chervenak F, McCullough L. Ethics in Obstetrics and Gynecology. New York: Oxford University Press; 1994:100-8.
7. I have developed this criticism more fully in Bioethics and Women. New York: Oxford University Press; 2006:61-9.